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HOHEPA WI NEERA: NATIVE TITLE 
AND THE PRIVY COUNCIL CHALLENGE 
John William Tate∗  
The case of Hohepa Wi Neera illustrates an unprecedented clash of judicial approaches to native 
title claims. On the one hand, the New Zealand Court of Appeal was determined to continue the line 
of reasoning most notably enshrined in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington. On the other hand, the 
Privy Council, in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had partially overturned Wi Parata by insisting that 
native title fell within the jurisdiction of the courts, at least when prerogative powers were not 
involved. The author argues that in Hohepa Wi Neera, the Court of Appeal quite deliberately tried 
to avoid the implications of the Privy Council's decision. In doing so, it exhibited a marked 
"colonial consciousness" which it was prepared to defend even to the extent of open breach with the 
Privy Council. The 1912 case of Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, however, showed the extent 
to which the Court of Appeal was capable of shedding that "colonial consciousness" and embracing 
the earlier Privy Council ruling. The author demonstrates that this apparent irony sheds light on 
our understanding of the earlier cases. 
The history of the New Zealand judiciary's response to native title claims in the wake of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington1 in 1877 is of particular interest. This 
is because this response eventually brought the New Zealand Court of Appeal into open breach with 
the Privy Council in 1903.2 This breach was the product of a clear divergence between the Privy 
Council and the New Zealand Courts in terms of their willingness to recognise native title claims 
against the Crown.3 The New Zealand Court of Appeal's formal protest against the Privy Council in 
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1  Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1878) 2 NZ Jur (NS) 72 (SC). 
2  For the sake of brevity, throughout this paper the term "Privy Council" has been used to refer to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. 
3  This breach manifested itself in a formal protest by the Court of Appeal against the Privy Council in 1903. 
The ostensible reason for the protest was the injudicious language which the Court of Appeal believed the 
Privy Council had used in Wallis v Solicitor General for New Zealand [1903] AC 173 to describe obiter 
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1903, which confirmed this breach, and which is "the only recorded instance of a New Zealand 
Court's publicly avowing its disapproval of a superior tribunal",4 made clear that the New Zealand 
judges perceived the Privy Council's position on native title to be a definite threat to the stability and 
security of colonial land settlement in New Zealand.5  
It is in this context that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's judgment in Hohepa Wi Neera v 
Bishop of Wellington6 needs to be understood. This was the first native title case that the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal had adjudicated on in full knowledge of the Privy Council's recent 
departure from New Zealand precedent in this area - in particular, its move against Prendergast CJ's 
judgment in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, which had formed the dominant New Zealand 
precedent on native title for the past twenty-five years.7 Indeed, the New Zealand Courts had shown 
  
dicta which the Court of Appeal had offered in a previous judgment, Solicitor-General v Bishop of 
Wellington [1901] 19 NZLR 665, which the Privy Council was overturning on appeal (see "Wallis and 
Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", [1840-1932] NZPCC Appendix, 730,  
730 Stout CJ; 747, 755-56 Williams J; 757 Edwards J). In particular, they objected to the implication, 
advanced by the Privy Council, that the point of view expressed by the Court of Appeal, in its obiter dicta, 
showed an undue subservience to the Executive (see "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of 
Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", 755-56 Williams J; 757 Edwards J). However it is evident that, despite 
these protestations, the underlying issue of contention animating the protest was the extent to which the 
Privy Council's judgment in Wallis v Solicitor-General, (along with its previous judgment in Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker (1900-01) [1840-1932] NZPCC 371) broke from the precedent of Wi Parata on native title 
issues. All of the judges in the protest criticised the Privy Council's judgment in Wallis v Solicitor-General 
in these substantive terms (see "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 
1903", above n 3, 732-34, 742-43 Stout CJ; 747-48, 749-50, 754-55 Williams J; 757 Edwards J). Indeed, all 
went as far as to accuse the Privy Council of ignorance of New Zealand law on these and other matters (see 
"Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", 732, 737, 743, 745, 746 
Stout CJ; 756 Williams J; 758-59 Edwards J). 
4  Sir Robin Cooke "The Nineteenth Century Chief Justices" in Robin Cooke (ed) Portrait of a Profession. 
The Centennial Book of the New Zealand Law Society (AH and AW Reed, Wellington, 1969) 46. 
5  Hence in the context of his protest, Chief Justice Stout said that if the dicta of the Privy Council in one of 
their native title cases were given effect to, "… no land title in the Colony would be safe." ("Wallis and 
Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 746 Stout CJ). Similarly, 
Justice Edwards stated: "It would be easy by reference to numerous decisions of the Court of Appeal and of 
the Supreme Court of this Colony, and to statutes which, passed after such decisions, recognising their 
validity, have virtually confirmed them, to show still further that the interpretation which their Lordships 
have put upon the laws relating to Native lands in this Colony is subversive of the law which has prevailed 
from its foundation; and that if that interpretation were acted upon, and carried to its legitimate conclusion 
in future cases, the titles to real estates in this Colony would be thrown into irretrievable doubt and 
confusion." ("Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 
757, Edwards J. Emphasis added).  
6  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington (1902) 21 NZLR 655 (CA). 
7  The Privy Council had departed from New Zealand's Wi Parata precedent in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, 
above n 3. Two years later it would do so again in Wallis v Solicitor-General, above n 3. Although the Court 
of Appeal's judgment in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3 had been delivered after the 
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a tenacious commitment to Wi Parata, not least its principle that the Crown is the "sole arbiter of its 
own justice" on native title matters, and so is capable of excluding the jurisdiction of the Courts.8 
Indeed, one Court of Appeal judge, delivering the judgment of the Court some seventeen years after 
Wi Parata, stated that the "security of all titles in the country depends on the maintenance of this 
principle."9  
Consequently, Hohepa Wi Neera provides an interesting focus on how the Court of Appeal 
managed to steer its judgment between the scylla of its continued commitment to Wi Parata, and the 
charybdis of a recent decision by a superior court which moved against it. Indeed, as we shall see, 
the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Hohepa Wi Neera provides evidence that it deliberately tried 
to evade the full implications of the Privy Council's recent decision on native title, and the threat 
which it posed to the Wi Parata precedent. It is even possible to explain the contours of the 
judgments in Hohepa Wi Neera precisely in terms of such a strategy. Consequently, far from the 
judges in Hohepa Wi Neera taking "scant stock" of the recent Privy Council ruling on native title, as 
Paul McHugh suggests, their judicial reasoning was defined and structured by their response to that 
very authority.10  
  
Privy Council's judgment in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, nevertheless the Privy Council judgment had not yet 
reached New Zealand before the Court of Appeal brought down its ruling in Solicitor-General v Bishop of 
Wellington (See "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 
3, 749 Williams J). Therefore the Hohepa Wi Neera judgment was the first native title ruling delivered by 
the Court of Appeal in full knowledge of the recent Privy Council departure from the Wi Parata precedent.  
On Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington as the authoritative New Zealand precedent on native title, at the time 
of the Hohepa Wi Neera judgment, see Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1894) 12 NZLR 483, 488 Richmond J; 
Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3, 685-86 Williams J. Yet although the Wi Parata 
precedent was upheld by the main line of New Zealand judicial authority until the early years of the 
twentieth century, there were some minor exceptions. On these, see John William Tate, "Pre-Wi Parata: 
Early Native Title Cases in New Zealand" (2003) 11 Waikato LR 112.  
8  Prendergast CJ articulated this principle as follows: "… in the case of primitive barbarians [among whom he 
clearly included the Maori tribes] the supreme executive Government must acquit itself, as best it may, of its 
obligations to respect native proprietary rights, and of necessity must be the sole arbiter of its own justice. 
Its acts in this particular cannot be examined or called in question by any tribunal, because there exist no 
known principles whereon a regular adjudication can be based."  (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above 
n 1, 78 Prendergast CJ). 
9  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 488 (CA) Richmond J.  
10  See Paul McHugh, The Maori Magna Carta. New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 119 [The Maori Magna Carta]. My thanks to the anonymous referee for 
the Victoria University of Wellington Law Review who brought this particular statement by McHugh to my 
attention. This paper also disagrees with the conclusion of Richard Boast and Andrew Erueti that, in the 
wake of the Privy Council ruling on native title in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, which was the first Privy 
Council judgment to explicitly depart from Wi Parata, "[s]uch case law as there has been since 1901 has 
accepted the Privy Council's views rather than those of Prendergast CJ." (Richard Boast and Andrew Erueti, 
"Maori Customary Law and Land Tenure", in Richard Boast and others, Maori Land Law (Butterworths, 
76 (2004) 35 VUWLR 
The Court of Appeal's Hohepa Wi Neera judgment is therefore a very interesting focus on the 
workings of senior elements of the New Zealand judiciary at a time when they saw the New Zealand 
settlement of native title, as enshrined in Wi Parata, under significant threat from an imperial Court. 
It is the argument of this paper that the response of the New Zealand Court of Appeal to this threat 
indicated the presence of a "colonial consciousness" on their part, where their primary concern was 
to evade the Privy Council ruling and defend the legal settlement on native title which they saw as 
most conducive to settler interests, even at the expense of an open breach with the Privy Council.  
I HOHEPA WI NEERA IN CONTEXT 
Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington was a native title case concerning the same land, 
under the same grant, that the Court had adjudicated on the previous year in Solicitor-General v 
Bishop of Wellington.11 However unlike that previous case, it was adjudicated upon by the Court of 
Appeal in full knowledge of the Privy Council's recent ruling on native title in Nireaha Tamaki v 
Baker (1900-01). Although the Privy Council had delivered that judgment prior to the Court of 
Appeal ruling in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington (1901), nevertheless the decision had not 
reached the Court of Appeal in time for it to influence their decision in that case.12 Hohepa Wi 
Neera v Bishop of Wellington was therefore the first New Zealand case to adjudicate on native title 
in full knowledge of the Privy Council's decision. 
But why is this significant? The answer lies in the extent to which the Privy Council's decision 
in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker broke from established New Zealand precedent on native title and 
thereby redefined the judicial landscape in relation to it. As mentioned above, the reigning New 
Zealand precedent on native title up to that time was the New Zealand Supreme Court judgment of 
Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1878). In that case, Prendergast CJ had resolved the native title 
issue in the interests of the Crown and settler society by insisting that native title matters involving 
the Crown were entirely a matter for the prerogative powers of the Crown, and were therefore 
outside the jurisdiction of the municipal courts.13 Prendergast CJ held that a mere declaration by the 
  
Wellington, 1999) 16). On the contrary, Hohepa Wi Neera provides a clear instance of the Court of Appeal, 
one year after the Privy Council's ruling in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, attempting to circumvent that ruling in 
order to maintain the authority of Prendergast CJ's judgment.  
11  Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3.  Both in turn were based on the same land and grant 
which arose for judgment in the Wi Parata case.  (See Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 
656 ) 
12   As Williams J put it: "The case of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker was decided by their Lordships shortly before 
our decision in [Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3] but the judgment had not then reached 
the Colony."  ("Wallis and Other v Solicitor-General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 
749 Williams J). 
13  Prendergast CJ identified native title matters with the prerogative powers of the Crown by insisting that 
Crown responsibilities regarding native title were akin to treaty obligations, and therefore any actions of the 
Crown arising from these responsibilities were acts of state, and for that reason, outside the jurisdiction of 
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Crown that native title was extinguished on any particular piece of land was sufficient indication of 
the exercise of that prerogative and therefore conclusive on the Courts.14 The result, according to 
Prendergast CJ, was that no  native title claim could prevail against the Crown, unless the Crown 
itself wished the claim to succeed, thereby ensuring that all Crown titles were safe from unwanted 
legal challenge in this respect.15 
Such a ruling was clearly in the interests of the Crown and the settlers who held Crown titles. 
Prendergast CJ had asserted that the Crown could unilaterally conclude any native title  claim, 
simply by declaring that the native title had indeed been lawfully extinguished, and Maori had no 
recourse to judicial appeal against such a declaration because, native title matters involving the 
Crown falling within the latter's prerogative powers, the Crown was the "sole arbiter of its own 
justice".16  One could not imagine a precedent more conducive to providing stability and security to 
settler interests in the colonizing process, at the expense of those Maori tribes whose land was now 
subject to that colonization. 
  
the courts. As Prendergast CJ put it, the Crown's duty of protecting the Maori tribes from "… any 
infringement of their right of occupancy … although not to be regarded as properly a treaty obligation, is yet 
in the nature of a treaty obligation. It is one, therefore, with the discharge of which no other power in the 
State can pretend to interfere. The exercise of the right and the discharge of the correlative duty, constitute 
an extraordinary branch of the prerogative, wherein the sovereign represents the entire body-politic, and not, 
as in the case of ordinary prerogative, merely the Supreme Executive power." (Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington, above n 1, 78-79). Prendergast CJ therefore concludes: "Transactions with the natives for the 
cession of their title to the Crown are thus to be regarded as acts of State, and therefore are not examinable 
by any Court … Especially it cannot be questioned, but must be assumed, that the sovereign power has 
properly discharged its obligations to respect, and cause to be respected, all native proprietary rights." (Wi 
Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 79). Paul McHugh has criticised Prendergast CJ's conclusion that 
the Crown's dealings with Maori over native title were "acts of State", on the following grounds: "By 1877 
the Maori's status as British subjects had been long fixed – how then could an 'act of state' be made by the 
Crown against its own subjects?" (Paul McHugh, "Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts" (1894) 2 
Canterbury LR 247 ["Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts"]. McHugh points out that a long line of 
judicial authority had established "… that as between the sovereign and a subject there can be no act of State 
on British territory…." ("Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts", 247 n 55). See also, The Maori Magna 
Carta, above n 10, 114.  
14  As Prendergast CJ put it: "In this country the issue of a Crown grant undoubtedly implies a declaration by 
the Crown that the native title over the land which it comprises has been extinguished. For the reason we 
have given, this implied fact is one not to be questioned in any Court of Justice, unless indeed the Crown 
should itself desire to question it, and should call upon the Court to lend its aid in correcting some admitted 
mistake." (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 78).  Prendergast CJ also pointed to a general 
prerogative power of the Crown to declare native title extinguished, independent of Crown grant (see Wi 
Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 80).   
15  See Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 78 Prendergast CJ. 
16  See Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 78 Prendergast CJ.  
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II THE PRIVY COUNCIL DEPARTURE FROM WI PARATA 
It is in this context that the impact of the Privy Council's departure from the Wi Parata 
precedent in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker must be understood. In departing from Wi Parata, the Privy 
Council was producing nothing less than a fundamental upheaval in the New Zealand legal 
landscape concerning issues of land settlement. The fact that, as we shall see below, the Privy 
Council's departure from Wi Parata was only partial, leaving some primary elements of the 
judgment intact, only heightens the significance of the New Zealand judicial response. Any 
suggestion that the Wi Parata precedent was in question, no matter how partial, was sufficient to 
arouse the concern of the New Zealand Bench, given the centrality of this precedent to land title and 
land settlement in New Zealand.17  
In Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, the Privy Council considered an appeal against a New Zealand 
Court of Appeal decision of the same name, decided in 1894. The 1894 case involved a claim by the 
plaintiff that land which the Crown had put up for sale belonged to him either under a Native Land 
Court order of 1871, or on the basis of native title.18 The Court of Appeal held that the former basis 
for title was void, and so the case proceeded on the assumption that the plaintiff was asserting a 
"pure Maori title" to the land.19 The two questions which therefore arose for adjudication in the 
1894 case were:20 
(1) Can the interest of the Crown in the subject-matter of this suit be attacked by this proceeding? 
(2) Has the Court jurisdiction to inquire whether, as a matter of fact, the land in dispute herein has 
been ceded by the Native owners to the Crown? 
The Court of Appeal answered both questions in the negative, upholding the principle of Wi 
Parata that native title matters involving the Crown fell entirely within the Crown's prerogative 
powers, and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Courts, so that the Crown was the sole 
determinant of justice in the matter. As Richmond J, delivering the judgment of the Court, put it:21 
The plaintiff comes here … on a pure Maori title, and the case is within the direct authority of Wi Parata 
v The Bishop of Wellington. … We see no reason to doubt the soundness of that decision. … According 
to what is laid down in the case cited, the mere assertion of the claim of the Crown is in itself sufficient 
to oust the jurisdiction of this or any other Court in the colony. There can be no known rule of law by 
  
17  See "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 732-34, 
742-43, 746 Stout CJ; 747-48, 749-50, 754-55 Williams J; 757 Edwards J. 
18  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 487-488 (CA). 
19  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 488 (CA) Richmond J. 
20  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 485 (CA).  
21  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 488 Richmond J (CA). 
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which the validity of dealings in the name and under the authority of the Sovereign with the Native 
tribes of this country for the extinction of their territorial rights can be tested. Such transactions began 
with the settlement of these Islands; so that Native custom is inapplicable to them. The Crown is under a 
solemn engagement to observe strict justice in the matter, but of necessity it must be left to the 
conscience of the Crown to determine what is justice. The security of all titles in the country depends on 
the maintenance of this principle. 
The plaintiff appealed to the Privy Council against this decision, and the same two questions 
arose for adjudication. The Privy Council reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal on the 
second question, finding that the Courts do have jurisdiction "… to inquire whether as a matter of 
fact the land in dispute has been ceded by the native owners to the Crown in accordance with 
law…"22 It did so on the basis of finding that the Native Rights Act 1865, was a clear statutory 
recognition of the legal existence of native title in New Zealand, and its justiciability in the 
Courts.23  However, the Privy Council reserved judgment on the first question, insisting that the 
issue of the Crown's prerogative powers, which according to Wi Parata barred any legal challenge 
on native title matters involving the Crown, did not arise in this case.24 Rather, as we shall see 
below, the Privy Council held that any authority exercised by the Crown officers in this case was 
exercised under statutory authority, rather than the prerogative, and so that authority was justiciable 
in the Courts.25   
Consequently, the Privy Council's overturning of the Wi Parata precedent in Nireaha Tamaki v 
Baker was only partial. It insisted that native title fell within the jurisdiction of the Courts, but on a 
statutory basis - the Native Rights Act 1865. Yet it reserved judgment on whether native title would 
still fall within the jurisdiction of the Courts if the Crown's prerogative powers were involved – that 
is, the very principle which was central to Wi Parata. Further, the Privy Council actually affirmed 
the final ruling of Prendergast CJ regarding the facts of the case in Wi Parata, including the ruling 
that the existence of a Crown grant was sufficient declaration by the Crown that the native title had 
been lawfully extinguished.26 It simply disagreed with some of his wider obiter dicta on native title. 
  
22  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 385 (PC).  
23  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 382-83 (PC). 
24  As Lord Davey put it, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council: "Their Lordships … express no opinion 
on the question which was mooted in the course of the argument whether the Native title could be 
extinguished by the exercise of the prerogative, which does not arise in the present case." (Nireaha Tamaki v 
Baker, above n 3, 385 (PC)).  
25  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 380-81 (PC).  
26  As Lord Davey stated: "In the case of Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington, already referred to, the 
decision was that the Court has no jurisdiction by scire facias or other proceeding to annul a Crown grant 
for matter not appearing on the face of it, and it was held that the issue of a Crown grant implies a 
declaration by the Crown that the Native title has been extinguished … But the dicta in the case go beyond 
what was necessary for the decision … As applied to the case then before the Court however, their 
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This disagreement was based in particular on Prendergast CJ's initial denial of the very existence of 
native title, embodied in Maori customary law.27 As Lord Davey put it:28 
[I]t was said in the case of Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, which was followed by the Court of 
Appeal in this case, that there is no customary law of the Maoris of which the Courts of law can take 
cognizance. Their Lordships think that this argument goes too far, and that it is rather late in the day for 
such an argument to be addressed to a New Zealand Court. It does not seem possible to get rid of the 
express words of ss 3 and 4 of the Native Rights Act, 1865, by saying (as the Chief Justice said in the 
case referred to) that 'a phrase in a statute cannot call what is non-existent into being'. It is the duty of 
the Courts to interpret the statute which plainly assumes the existence of a tenure of land under custom 
and usage which is either known to lawyers or discoverable by them by evidence…  The legislation both 
of the Imperial Parliament and of the Colonial Legislature is consistent with this view of the 
construction and effect of the Native Rights Act, and one is rather at a loss to know what is meant by 
such expressions 'Native title', 'Native lands', 'owners', and 'proprietors', or the careful provision against 
sale of Crown lands until the Native title has been extinguished if there be no such title cognizable by 
the law and no title therefore to be extinguished. 
However despite these criticisms of Prendergast CJ's judgment, we have seen that the Privy 
Council stopped short of challenging the central doctrine of the Wi Parata precedent – that native 
title matters involving the Crown were subject to the Crown's prerogative powers, and so outside the 
jurisdiction of the Courts. The Privy Council therefore overturned the 1894 decision of the Court of 
Appeal, and its defence of Wi Parata, by holding that in this particular case, the native title matters 
  
Lordships see no reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges." 
(Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 383-84 (PC)).  
27  Hence at one point in his Wi Parata judgment, Prendergast CJ went so far as to assert a terra nullius 
position that native title did not exist, on the grounds that there was no Maori customary law to sustain it. 
For instance, after referring to the New South Wales Act, 4 Vict 7, and the Land Claims Ordinance 1841, 
Prendergast states: "… these measures were avowedly framed upon the assumption that there existed 
amongst the natives no regular system of territorial rights nor any definite ideas of property in land …" (Wi 
Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 77). Later in his judgment he criticises the reference in the Native 
Rights Act 1865 to the "Ancient Custom and Usage of the Maori People", "… as if some such body of 
customary law did in reality exist. But a phrase in a statute cannot call what is non-existent into being. As 
we have shown, the proceedings of the British Government and the legislation of the colony have at all 
times been practically based on the contrary supposition, that no such body of law existed; and herein have 
been in entire accordance with good sense and indubitable facts." (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above 
n 1, 79). Such a position was clearly at odds with Prendergast CJ's insistence elsewhere in his judgment that 
native title did indeed exist, but was subject to the prerogative powers of the Crown. Subsequent judicial 
authority upheld this latter position as the authoritative precedent on Wi Parata and tended to ignore the 
former terra nullius position (see Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7 (CA); Solicitor-General v Bishop of 
Wellington, above n 3; Tate, above n 7.) 
28  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 382-83 (PC).   
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involving the Crown did fall within the Court's jurisdiction, but only on the assumption that the 
question of the Crown's prerogative over native title did not arise:29 
Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the order of the Court of Appeal should be reversed, and a 
declaration should be made in answer to the third and fourth issues of law as follows: That it not 
appearing that the estate and interest of the Crown in the subject-matter of this suit subject to such 
Native titles (if any) as have not been extinguished in accordance with law is being attacked by this 
proceeding, the Court has jurisdiction to inquire whether as a matter of fact the land in dispute has been 
ceded by the Native owners to the Crown in accordance with law… 
III IMPACT ON WI PARATA 
Nevertheless, despite these qualifications, the Privy Council's judgment was a significant 
departure from the Wi Parata precedent. This was due to the identity of the respondent in the case. 
The respondent was a senior Crown official - the Commissioner of Crown Lands for the Wellington 
District.30 It was his authority to sell the lands in accordance with the Land Act, 1892, which was 
being challenged by the appellant in this case. The appellant insisted that part of the lands proposed 
for sale by the Land Commissioner were lands upon which the native title had not been 
extinguished.31 The Land Commissioner insisted, on the basis of Wi Parata, that because native title 
claims involving the Crown were a matter for the Crown's prerogative, the Courts had no 
jurisdiction to determine this claim, and the declaration of the Crown was conclusive on the 
matter.32 As we have seen, the New Zealand Court of Appeal had agreed with this latter position, 
  
29  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 385  (PC). 
30  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 483 (CA). At one point, the defendants also included the Attorney-
General for New Zealand. In the facts of the case outlined in the 1894 judgment, the Court of Appeal stated: 
"The plaintiff took out a summons for leave to join the Attorney-General as a defendant, and, on the order 
being made for the argument of questions of law, it was agreed between the parties that, if the Court was of 
opinion that the Attorney-General was a necessary party, the questions should be dealt with as if he had 
been made a party, and had raised all the defences raised by the defendant." (Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, 
above n 7, 485 (CA)). The Court of Appeal held that the Attorney-General was a necessary party to the case, 
stating: "In our opinion, the Attorney-General is a necessary party to this suit, and, that being so, he is by 
consent to be considered as a defendant ..." (Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 487 (CA)). However the 
Privy Council rejected this ruling on appeal, stating: "The Court of Appeal thought that the Attorney-
General was a necessary party to the action, but it follows from what their Lordships have said as to the 
character of the action that in their opinion he was neither a necessary nor a proper party." (Nireaha Tamaki 
v Baker, above n 3, 381 (PC)).  
31  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 483 (CA). 
32  As Council for the Defence stated for the Land Commissioner: "The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain 
the suit. The acts and proceedings of the Crown are conclusive that the Native title has been extinguished: 
Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington [above n 1]. The declaration gazetted under section 136 of 'The Land Act, 
1892', is alone a sufficient exercise of the Crown's prerogative in this respect." (Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, 
above n 7, 486-87 (CA) Gully).  
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and so had declined jurisdiction over the matter.33 Yet the Privy Council was able to arrive at the 
contrary conclusion, by ruling that the Commissioner of Crown Lands, although an official of the 
Crown, was exercising his authority under statutory powers, and not the Crown's prerogative 
powers. On this basis, the Privy Council argued, the issue of the Crown's prerogative powers did not 
arise, and so the case was justiciable before the Courts. As Lord Davey put it:34 
Their Lordships think that the learned Judges have misapprehended the true object and scope of the 
action, and that the fallacy of their judgment is to treat the respondent as if he were the Crown or acting 
under the authority of the Crown for the purposes of this action. The object of the action is to restrain the 
respondent from infringing the appellant's rights by selling property on which he alleges an interest in 
assumed pursuance of a statutory authority the conditions of which (it is alleged) have not been 
complied with. The respondent's authority to sell on behalf of the Crown is derived solely from the 
statutes and is confined within the four corners of the statutes. The Governor in notifying that the lands 
were rural land open for sale was acting and stated himself to be acting in pursuance of s. 136 of the 
Land Act, 1892, and the respondent in his notice of sale purports to sell in terms of s. 137 of the same 
Act. If the land were not within the powers of those sections (as is alleged by the appellant), the 
respondent had no power to sell the lands, and his threat to do so was an unauthorized invasion of the 
appellant's alleged rights.  
So the Privy Council ruled in favour of the appellant and his native title claims, and against the 
Commissioner of Crown Lands, solely in terms of the Commissioner's statutory powers, thereby 
reserving judgment on the extent to which the Crown still retained prerogative powers over native 
title.35 Yet this was of little comfort to the authorities in New Zealand, who quickly saw the full 
implications of the Privy Council judgment for the Wi Parata precedent.36 Most alarmingly, the 
  
33  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 488 (CA) Richmond J. 
34  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 380-81 (PC). 
35  As Lord Davey put it: "… there is no suggestion of the extinction of the appellant's title by the exercise of 
the prerogative outside the statutes if such a right still exists." (Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 381-82 
(PC)).  
36  Indeed, according to Paul McHugh, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Land Titles Protection Act 1902 
in response to this Privy Council decision (See The Maori Magna Carta, above n 10, 118). The long title to 
the Act described it as "An Act to protect the Land Titles of the Colony from Frivolous Attacks in certain 
Cases." (Land Titles Protection Act 1902, No 37, 2 Edw VII. Section 2(1) of the Act then proceeded to 
protect the Crown from any native title claims which the Crown itself did not wish to entertain: "In the case 
of Native land or land acquired from Natives, the validity of any order of the Native Land Court, Crown 
grant, or other instrument of title purporting to have been issued under the authority of law which has 
subsisted for not less than ten years prior to the passing of this Act shall not be called in question in any 
Court, or be the subject of any order of the Chief Judge of the Native Land Court … unless with the consent 
of the Governor in Council first had and obtained; and in the absence of such consent this Act shall be an 
absolute bar to the initiation of any proceedings in any Court calling in question the validity of any such 
order, Crown grant or instrument of title, or the jurisdiction of the Native Land Court to make any such 
order, or the power of the Governor to make and issue any such Crown grant." Consequently, the Land 
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ruling meant that Prendergast CJ's conclusion that the Crown was the "sole arbiter of its own 
justice" on native title issues no longer held. The actions of Crown officials, relating to the 
extinguishment of native title, could now be adjudicated upon by the Courts, so long as the Court 
found that the Crown officials were not exercising the prerogative powers of the Crown, but rather 
were acting under statutory authority. Whether they were acting under Crown or statutory authority 
was clearly an open question, given that the Court of Appeal had ruled in 1894 that the Land 
Commissioner was exercising the Crown's prerogative powers, and the Privy Council had ruled 
seven years later that he was not.  
In other words, the central platform of the Wi Parata precedent, and of the land settlement 
process in New Zealand – that native title matters involving the Crown fell exclusively within the 
prerogative powers of the Crown and so outside the jurisdiction of the Courts – was looking 
extremely shaky. Despite the fact that the Privy Council had denied it was challenging those 
prerogative powers, in practical terms the outcome of their judgment was to establish a precedent 
that native title matters involving the Crown could be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in 
specified circumstances.37 The authority of the Wi Parata precedent to protect the land settlement 
process in New Zealand from native title challenge had therefore been broken. From a settler 
perspective therefore, the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had rendered the land 
settlement process in New Zealand subject to uncertainty and insecurity. 
This was clearly recognised by the New Zealand Court of Appeal judges. For instance, two 
years later, in the Court of Appeal's protest against the Privy Council, Stout CJ stated that if the 
dicta of the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) were given effect to, "… no land title 
in the Colony would be safe."38 Similarly, referring to the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker (1900-01) and Wallis v Solicitor-General (1903), both of which departed from the 
Wi Parata precedent, Edwards J articulates a similar sentiment, stating that "… the interpretation 
which their Lordships have put upon the laws relating to Native lands in this Colony is subversive of 
the law which has prevailed from its foundation; and … if that interpretation were acted upon, and 
  
Titles Protection Act 1902, passed soon after the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above 
n 3 (PC), was clearly a legislative attempt to defend the Crown's prerogative powers over native title, which 
were believed to have been attacked in that case, by giving them a statutory basis. It therefore sought to 
enshrine the Wi Parata precedent, which had hitherto protected the Crown from unwanted native title 
claims, in statutory law. 
37  Indeed, the Privy Council even seemed to question whether this Crown prerogative power over native title 
was still in existence, suggesting that all conceivable instances of extinguishment of native title by the 
Crown would now be regulated by statute (see Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 381-82 (PC)). Though 
again, they refrained from any definitive judgment on this question. 
38  "Wallis and Others v Solicitor-General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 746 Stout CJ. 
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carried to its legitimate conclusion in future cases, the titles to real estates in this Colony would be 
thrown into irretrievable doubt and confusion."39  
IV THE HOHEPA WI NEERA JUDGMENT 
So how did the Court of Appeal deal with this direct challenge to the Wi Parata precedent? The 
answer lay in their response to a native title case which arose the following year, Hohepa Wi Neera 
v Bishop of Wellington (1902). In normal circumstances, this case would have fallen directly within 
the authority of Wi Parata and would have been decided in identical terms to that case. This is 
because the facts of the case were the same as Wi Parata, involving the same land and the same 
grant to the Bishop of Wellington. The Hohepa Wi Neera case therefore provided a clear 
confrontation between the established Wi Parata precedent and the new Privy Council ruling in 
Nireaha Tamaki v Baker. As we shall see, much of the Court of Appeal's reasoning in this case can 
be understood as a definite attempt to preserve central elements of the Wi Parata precendent from 
the impact of the Privy Council's recent decision. The case therefore provides a clear example of the 
extent to which the Court of Appeal was willing to go in evading a ruling of a superior Court in 
order to maintain a cherished New Zealand precedent on native title.  
A The Facts of the Case 
The facts of the Hohepa Wi Neera case were very similar to those arising in Wi Parata v Bishop 
of Wellington and Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington.40 Indeed Williams J states: "It is 
difficult to distinguish the present case from the case of Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington, 
which dealt with the same subject-matter."41 While the judgment of the Court of Appeal in The 
Solicitor-General v The Bishop of Wellington (1901) was being appealed in the Privy Council, a 
member of the Ngatitoa tribe, Hohepa Wi Neera, brought another action against the Bishop of 
Wellington and the Solicitor-General. He claimed that he was the successor to one of the native 
parties who had signed an 1848 letter ceding land to the Bishop of Wellington for the building of a 
college in the area of Porirua.42 In this action "… he sought to have it declared that the Crown grant 
[to the Bishop] was void, and, further, that the land had never been ceded by the Natives, that the 
Native title had never been extinguished, and that the land was still owned according to Native 
  
39  "Wallis and Others v Solicitor-General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 757 Edwards 
J (emphasis added). 
40  See Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 655, 656.  
41  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 671 Williams J.  
42  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 656. 
  
 HOHEPA WI NEERA 85 
custom by the successors of those entitled in 1848."43 Argument of questions of law before trial 
were therefore removed to the Court of Appeal.44 
B Stout CJ and the Recognition of Native Title 
Chief Justice Stout began his judgment in Hohepa Wi Neera with an attempt to firmly establish 
the legal basis of native title within New Zealand law. He began by referring to chapter xii, section 9 
of the Imperial Instructions of 1846 which, he says, allows land claims of aboriginal inhabitants to 
be admitted to prospective statutory land courts (as distinct from municipal courts) if "… the 
claimants or their progenitors or those from whom they derived title had actually had the occupation 
of the lands so claimed, and had been accustomed to use and enjoy the same either as places of 
abode, or for tillage, or for the growth of crops, or for the depasturing of cattle, or otherwise for the 
convenience and sustentation of life by means of labour expended thereon."45 He also points to the 
Native Rights Act of 1865 with its reference to "… titles to land held under Maori custom and usage 
…".46 The latter seems to amount to a clear admission, on the part of Stout CJ, of the statutory 
recognition of customary occupation and use of land as a legitimate basis for land title among the 
Maori population. In other words, in addition to the 1846 Instructions, it  appears to be an effective 
recognition of native title, and to this extent, clearly departs from those elements of Prendergast CJ's 
judgment in Wi Parata which, at some points, had denied the very existence of such title.47  
Stout CJ then points to the establishment of statutory procedures for the investigation of native 
title, beginning in 1862, and involving the establishment of a Native Land Court in 1865. He states: 
"There has since 1865 ever been a Native Land Court to investigate Native title; and the uniform 
rule has been, until such investigation was determined the Supreme Court did not recognise the title 
of any Native to sue for possession of land uninvestigated by the [Land] Court."48 While this moves 
in the direction of the Wi Parata principle that native title, in and of itself, lies outside the 
jurisdiction of the municipal courts, it is not a denial of the existence of native title. Indeed, it is 
precisely such title that the statutory Land Court was established to investigate.  
Finally, Stout CJ points out that under the terms of the Instructions of 1846, "… lands not 
claimed by or on behalf of the Maoris were deemed the demesne lands of the Crown."49 Again, this 
  
43  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 655.  
44  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 656.   
45  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 664-65, Stout CJ. 
46  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 666 Stout CJ. 
47  See Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 77; 79. 
48  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 665 Stout CJ. 
49  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 664 Stout CJ. See also Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of 
Wellington, above n 6, 663 Stout CJ.  
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is an implicit recognition of native title, since in the absence of native title, all land would be 
demesne lands of the Crown, until ceded by grant to settlers.50  
As we have seen, although at some points within the Wi Parata judgment, Prendergast CJ had 
articulated what seemed to be a terra nullius doctrine by denying the existence of native title 
altogether, at other points he fully affirmed the existence of native title but confined it within the 
prerogative powers of the Crown, thereby denying the municipal courts any jurisdiction to 
investigate native title in and of itself.51 It is this second aspect of the Wi Parata precedent which 
  
50  This was the inevitable conclusion of the terra nullius doctrine, which applied in the absence of native title. 
This doctrine held that upon the acquisition of sovereignty over newly discovered territory, the Crown 
acquired all land as demesne lands of the Crown. This doctrine was asserted by the defence in the Mabo 
case. Justice Brennan articulated their position, for the sake of exposition, as follows: "On analysis, the 
defendant's argument is that, when the territory of a settled colony became part of the Crown's dominions, 
the law of England so far as applicable to colonial conditions became the law of the colony and, by that law, 
the Crown acquired the absolute beneficial ownership of all land in the territory so that the colony became 
the Crown's demesne and no right or interest in any land in the territory could thereafter be possessed by any 
other person unless granted by the Crown." (Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 26 Brennan J.).  
51  Such inconsistencies were a marked feature of Prendergast CJ's Wi Parata judgment. At one point, 
Prendergast CJ seemed to deny the Courts any jurisdiction to investigate native title claims, in and of 
themselves, when he said: "On the one hand, it has always been certain that a Maori could bring trespass or 
ejectment in respect of land held by him under a Crown grant. On the other hand, it has been equally clear 
that the Court could not take cognizance of mere native rights to land." (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, 
above n 1, 79. Emphasis added). However elsewhere in his judgment, Prendergast CJ seemed to imply that 
there were times when the municipal courts would have jurisdiction over native title claims, such as when 
the Crown actively supported that jurisdiction. As he put it: "In this country the issue of a Crown grant 
undoubtedly implies a declaration by the Crown that the native title over the land which it comprises has 
been extinguished. For the reason we have given, this implied fact is one not to be questioned in any Court 
of Justice, unless indeed the Crown should itself desire to question it, and should call upon the Court to lend 
its aid in correcting some admitted mistake."  (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 78. Emphasis 
added). Prendergast CJ's brother judge in the Wi Parata case, Richmond J, went even further and suggested 
that the municipal courts might have jurisdiction over native title in those cases where the Crown was not 
involved, thereby allowing the Court to refer the matter to the appropriate statutory body, the Native Land 
Court. As Richmond J put it: "The Native Rights Act, 1865, declares this Court shall take cognizance of 
Maori custom, but the Legislature requires us to send any question of Maori title to the Native Lands Court. 
It is as much as to say, it is a jurisdiction we are incapable of exercising … If you can imagine such a thing 
as the rights of natives inter se, questions of that kind must go to the Native Lands Court … [However] [i]t 
is quite plain that we have no power to refer to the Native Lands Court the question whether the native title 
has been effectually extinguished by her Majesty, and it would be a monstrous thing if we could be required 
to do it." (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 75. Emphasis added). Consequently, if we ignore 
those points in the Wi Parata judgment where Prendergast CJ adopts a fully blown terra nullius position, 
we can see that the judgment actually gives rise to conflicting precedent concerning the extent to which the 
municipal courts have jurisdiction over native title matters, in and of themselves. At times Prendergast CJ 
implies that all native title matters are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Courts. At other times, both 
Prendergast CJ and Richmond J seem to exclude only those cases where the Crown is involved and where it 
does not support the matter appearing before the Courts.  
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was upheld by subsequent New Zealand judicial decisions on native title.52 The question therefore 
arises of how far Stout CJ, and his brother judge, Williams J, moved beyond this precedent in 
Hohepa Wi Neera. 
C The Impact of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker  
As we have seen, the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker departed from the Wi 
Parata precedent by insisting that native title issues involving Maori and the executive government 
did fall within the jurisdiction of the municipal courts, to the extent that they fell within the scope of 
statutory authority, although it reserved judgment on issues of Crown prerogative. As discussed 
above, despite this qualification, the Privy Council decision was still understood in New Zealand as 
a threat to the Wi Parata precedent, because it meant that the Crown could now be subject to native 
title challenge in the Courts.  
In Nireaha Tamaki, the Privy Council further departed from the Wi Parata precedent in their 
interpretation of the Native Rights Act 1865. In Wi Parata, Prendergast CJ had insisted that the 
legislature had not intended that the Crown be bound by the Native Rights Act 1865, because the 
Crown was not specifically mentioned in the Act.53 He therefore ruled that the Crown could not be 
ordered by the Supreme Court to appear before the statutory Native Land Court in order to have 
native title matters determined under the terms of the Act.54   Yet this was the very Act which the 
Privy Council relied on in Nireaha Tamaki to bind the Crown by holding that the Supreme Court 
could order that native title matters involving the Crown be referred for determination to that same 
statutory Court. As Lord Davey put it:55 
By section 5 it is plainly contemplated that cases might arise in the Supreme Court in which the title or 
some interest in Native land is involved, and in that case provision is made for the investigation of such 
titles and the ascertainment of such interests being remitted to a Court specifically constituted for the 
purpose. The legislation both of the Imperial Parliament and of the Colonial Legislature is consistent 
with this view of the construction and effect of the Native Rights Act ...   
Yet it appears that the Privy Council went even further and, suggested that questions of the 
existence of native title could be recognised by the Supreme Court itself  prior to any determination 
by the Native Land Court. As Lord Davey states:56 
  
52  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7; Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3; Tate above n 
7. 
53  See Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 80. 
54  Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 80. 
55  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 382-83 (PC).  
56  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 383 (PC). 
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Their Lordships think that the Supreme Court are bound to recognize the fact of the 'rightful possession 
and occupation of the Natives' until extinguished in accordance with law in any action in which such 
title is involved, and (as has been seen) means are provided for the ascertainment of such a title. The 
Court is not called upon in the present case to ascertain or define as against the Crown the exact nature 
or incidents of such a title, but merely to say whether it exists or existed as a matter of fact and whether 
it has been extinguished according to law. If necessary for the ascertainment of the appellant's alleged 
rights, the Supreme Court must seek the assistance of the Native Land Court, but that circumstance does 
not appear to their Lordships an objection to the Supreme Court entertaining the appellant's action. 
D Stout CJ's Reponse 
The Privy Council's interpretation of the Native Rights Act was clearly perceived by Stout CJ as 
another threat to the Wi Parata precedent, and the established system of land settlement in New 
Zealand. In particular, Lord Davey's statement above implied that the Supreme Court could take 
cognizance of native title matters, in and of themselves, before the Native Land Court had converted 
such native title to a freehold title. Indeed, the Privy Council had concluded that the Supreme Court 
itself "… has jurisdiction to inquire whether as a matter of fact the land in dispute has been ceded by 
the Native owners to the Crown in accordance with law. ..."57 However, according to Stout CJ, the 
settled principle in New Zealand was the contrary one - that the Supreme Court had no such 
jurisdiction, and could not recognise native title claims to land, being able only to recognise the 
freehold certificate that the Native Land Court issued in conversion of the native title to freehold 
title. As Stout CJ put it:58 
There has since 1865 ever been a Native Land Court to investigate Native title; and the uniform rule has 
been, until such investigation was determined the Supreme Court did not recognise the title of any 
Native to sue for possession of land uninvestigated by the [Native Land] Court. It has always been 
assumed - at all events up to the decision of Tamaki v Baker [1901] AC 561 - that [this] … was a true 
declaration of the law. The earliest decision of the Supreme Court on the subject is, I believe, that of 
McIntosh [sic] v Symonds [NZ Gazette (1847), p 63]. In the very able and learned judgment of the late 
Mr. Justice Chapman, approved of by the Chief Justice Sir William Martin, it was held that the Supreme 
Court could not recognize any title not founded on the Queen's patent as the source of private title. This 
decision was followed in several cases, the most important of which was Wi Parata v The Bishop of 
Wellington … 
  
57  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 385 (PC). 
58  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 665-66 Stout CJ.  Further, Stout CJ's claim in the 
passage above concerning the conclusions reached in R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387 (SC) is based on a 
selective reading of that judgment, and is in fact misleading. For a further discussion of this issue, see Tate, 
above n 7. 
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However, in pointing in the passage above to the established New Zealand precedent that the 
Courts could only recognise land titles deriving from the Crown and therefore could not recognise 
native title, it does not appear that Stout CJ was asserting this in an attempt to overrule the Privy 
Council judgment. Rather, he makes this point in the context of his wider exposition of New 
Zealand law on native title, and points out in the passage above that it was believed to be "a true 
declaration of the law", "at all events up to the decision of Tamaki v Baker". In other words, far 
from attempting to overturn the new Privy Council judgment by asserting a contrary New Zealand 
one, Stout CJ was merely pointing to the extent to which the Privy Council judgment, in allowing 
the municipal courts to take cognisance of native title (a form of title which does not derive from the 
Crown) departed from established law and practice in New Zealand.59  
Stout CJ also communicated what he believed was the legal uncertainty produced by the Privy 
Council in its Nireaha Tamaki judgment by emphasising the extent to which he believed the Privy 
Council's interpretation of the Native Rights Act 1865 in that judgment departed from that of all 
reputable legal authority in New Zealand, including those who enacted it:60 
The interpretation of the Native Rights Act given by the Privy Council may have an effect not dreamed 
of by the Legislature that passed it, nor understood by the Judges of the Supreme Court since it was 
enacted. 
As we saw, the Privy Council ruled in Nireaha Tamaki that the Native Rights Act bound the Crown 
and placed it within the jurisdiction of the Courts on native title matters when the actions of the 
Crown had a statutory basis. Stout CJ goes so far as to reject the Privy Council's interpretation of the 
Native Rights Act, and reasserts the Wi Parata view that the Crown is not bound by this statute. As 
he states:61 
I may further point out that so far as the Native Rights Act is concerned it could not bind the Crown. 
Our 'Interpretation Act, 1888' is very explicit. It says that no Act must be read 'in any manner or way 
whatsoever to affect the rights of the Crown unless it is expressly stated therein that the Crown is bound 
thereby' … I mention these facts, as they are not referred to in the judgment of Tamaki v Baker, and the 
Privy Council does not seem to have been informed of the circumstances of the colony when - and for 
many years afterwards - the Act was passed.  
  
59  Native title was the one form of land title which was held not to derive from the Crown. Rather, in so far as 
it was based on customary native ownership, native title was held to precede the Crown, and its acquisition 
of sovereignty, and to become a "burden" on the Crown's radical title once that sovereignty was acquired. 
See Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 51 Brennan J.  
60  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 667 Stout CJ. 
61  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 667 Stout CJ.  For the Wi Parata view that the Crown 
is not bound by this statute, see Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 80 Prendergast CJ. 
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V THE COURT OF APPEAL'S BROADER STRATEGY 
So we see therefore that Stout CJ critically confronted the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker at a number of points. Yet with the exception of the last criticism above concerning 
the interpretation of the Native Rights Act 1865, these critical confrontations did not lead to a 
reassertion of the principles of Wi Parata over and above those of the Privy Council. Much of Stout 
CJ's argument above was a reflection on the extent to which the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki 
had departed from New Zealand precedent and the uncertainty this would produce. As such, it was 
not really central to the Court of Appeal in reaching its conclusions in the Hohepa Wi Neera case. 
What was central was what I call the Court of Appeal's "broader strategy" in Hohepa Wi Neera. 
It was this strategy that allowed it to reach its final conclusions in the case, crucial to which was a 
ruling that, despite the wider criticisms of the Privy Council, central elements of Wi Parata could 
still be applied as authoritative precedent in Hohepa Wi Neera. Such a result could only be achieved 
by Stout CJ, and his brother judge Williams J (with one or the other of whom the rest of the Court 
concurred) through their adoption of a more subtle defence of Wi Parata than the articulation of its 
open differences from Nireaha Tamaki espoused by Stout CJ above. A deeper reading of the 
separate judgments of each of these figures reveals this "broader strategy" in action. Rather than 
confronting the Privy Council decision head-on, disputing its claims and effectively placing itself in 
clear opposition to the ruling of a superior court, this broader strategy attempted to minimise the 
impact of the Privy Council's departure from Wi Parata, either by insisting that the Privy Council's 
decision was not a significant departure from Wi Parata (Stout), or by insisting that the Privy 
Council's decision was not directly relevant to the facts of the present case (Williams).  
As we have seen, the facts of the present case were almost identical to those that confronted 
Prendergast CJ and Richmond J in Wi Parata. 62  The main difference between Prendergast CJ and 
Richmond J's deliberation on these facts in 1877, and the Court of Appeal's deliberation in the 
present case, was that the Court of Appeal was now faced with a Privy Council decision which 
departed significantly from the Wi Parata precedent at various points, and so mitigated against a 
direct application of Wi Parata to the present case. Consequently, a basic feature of the Court of 
Appeal's judgment in Hohepa Wi Neera was an attempt to circumvent this inconvenient 
  
62  The basis upon which the plaintiff attempted to impeach the Crown's grant to the Bishop of New Zealand in 
Hohepa Wi Neera was "… that the land has never been legally ceded to the Crown, that the Crown grant of 
the land in 1850 to the Bishop of New Zealand … was null and void, and that the land was still Native land, 
the property according to Native custom of the successors of those who were so entitled in 1848 ..." 
(Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 656. See also Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of 
Wellington, above n 6, 660-61). Further, the plaintiff claimed on separate grounds that the failure to 
establish a school on the site as anticipated in the grant rendered the grant void and so the land in question 
should revert to the original native donors. (Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 658). 
These were effectively the same grounds as those relied on by the plaintiff in Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington: see Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 73-76 GE Barton for the plaintiff.  
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development by limiting the extent to which the Privy Council decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker 
precluded a direct application of Wi Parata to the facts of the present case. We will now consider 
how Stout CJ and Williams J each attempted this in turn. 
A Stout CJ's Strategy 
Although Stout CJ does not say so in so many words, it is clear that his strategy for minimising 
the impact of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker on the Wi Parata precedent was to minimise the extent to 
which the Privy Council's decision was perceived as departing from that precedent. As mentioned 
earlier, although the Privy Council criticised significant elements of Prendergast CJ's obiter dicta on 
native title in Wi Parata, and moved against the spirit of that judgment by insisting that the Crown 
officials dealing with native title were exercising statutory authority and so were subject to the 
jurisdiction of the municipal courts, it actually affirmed the conclusions Prendergast CJ arrived at in 
his Wi Parata judgment, in particular, his claim that a Crown grant be taken as conclusive evidence 
that the native title had been extinguished.63  Stout CJ therefore insisted that the present case once 
again involved these same legal questions, and so the conclusions of Wi Parata could once again be 
directly applied to it, irrespective of the Privy Council's criticism of the wider obiter dicta in that 
case. As Stout CJ put it:64 
It does not, however, seem to me necessary to inquire how far the decision in Tamaki v Baker … has set 
aside the law and procedure of the Supreme Court in dealing with the claims of Maoris to land the titles 
of which have not been ascertained by the Native Land Courts … The important point in that decision 
bearing on this case seems to me to be that it declares that Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington was 
rightly decided, though it disapproves of certain dicta in the judgment. It is affirmed [in Nireaha Tamaki 
v Baker] that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to annul the grant for matters not appearing on its 
face, and that 'the issue of a Crown grant implies a declaration by the Crown that the Native title has 
been extinguished'. In my opinion, this Court should follow the decision in Wi Parata v The Bishop of 
Wellington … and, following it, an answer adverse to the plaintiff … must be entered.   
Now as we have seen, in his protest the following year, Stout CJ made clear the extent to which 
he believed the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker was a threat to the stability and 
security of land settlement in New Zealand.65 He perceived this decision to be a threat precisely 
because of the extent to which it departed from the Wi Parata precedent. Yet in the passage above, 
Stout CJ adopted the opposite tack, minimising the extent to which the Privy Council's decision 
  
63  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 383-84 Lord Davey (PC). On Prendergast CJ's view in Wi Parata 
that a Crown grant is conclusive evidence that the native title has been extinguished, see Wi Parata v Bishop 
of Wellington, above n 1, 78 Prendergast CJ. 
64  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 667, Stout CJ. 
65  See "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 746 Stout 
CJ.   
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could be seen as a departure from Wi Parata. In so doing, he minimised the wider implications of 
that departure by insisting that, because the Privy Council had ruled that Wi Parata had been rightly 
decided on the facts, and those facts were the same in the present case, its wider criticisms of Wi 
Parata were irrelevant to the case at hand. The result was that the Privy Council's decision did not 
prevent the direct application of the conclusions of Wi Parata to the present case. Hence by 
minimising the Privy Council's departure from Wi Parata, Stout CJ was able to claim that the latter 
was still the authoritative precedent to be applied, at least to the facts before him.  
B Williams J's Strategy 
Williams J's strategy for minimising the impact of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker was somewhat 
different to that of Stout CJ. At one level, Williams J seemed to fully accept the new legal situation 
on native title ushered in by the Privy Council, in particular the Privy Council's rejection of the Wi 
Parata ruling that the municipal courts had no jurisdiction over native title. He stated (without 
criticism) that the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) "… decided that by 
virtue of 'The Native Rights Act, 1865', a suit could be brought upon a native title, and therefore that 
a native holding under such a title, if his title were put in jeopardy by an officer of the Crown acting 
outside his statutory authority, could bring a suit to restrain the officer from so acting." 66  
He seemed to further affirm this new legal situation when he cited, also without criticism and 
therefore with apparent approval, other elements of the Nireaha Tamaki judgment that departed 
from the Wi Parata precedent:67 
The judgment further states … that, as at the present time the exclusive right of pre-emption by the 
Crown over Native lands and of extinguishing the Native title is exercised by the constitutional 
Ministers of the Crown, on behalf of the public, in accordance with the provisions of statutes in that 
behalf, the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the provisions of those statutes have been complied 
with, and the Native title extinguished in accordance with them. The judgment states … that in the case 
then before the Court there was no suggestion of the extinction of the appellant's title by the exercise of 
the prerogative outside the statutes, and questions whether such a right still exists. But the doubt as to 
the existence at present of a prerogative right to extinguish the Native title obviously rests on the fact 
that the extinguishment of Native title is stated by the Privy Council to be now regulated by statute. 
Williams J does not challenge these Privy Council findings in any way, even though they clearly 
depart from the direction which the Court of Appeal had followed since Wi Parata, particularly 
concerning the extent to which the Crown is immune from native title challenge due to the existence 
of its prerogative. However what Williams J does do is to argue that none of the above Privy 
Council conclusions are applicable to the present case, because the facts informing the present case 
  
66  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 670 Williams J.  
67  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 670 Williams J. 
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occurred at a time prior to the enactment of the statutes (in particular, the Native Rights Act 1865) 
upon which the Privy Council relied in coming to its conclusions on native title. As Williams J 
states:68 
In the present case, however, we have to deal with transactions which took place before New Zealand 
became a self-governing colony, and long before the statutes now regulating the rights of Natives and 
the ascertainment of title to and the disposition of Native lands were in existence … There were no 
statutes regulating the acquisition of Native rights of occupancy by the Crown, whether by purchase, gift 
from the natives, or otherwise. If the question arose in any particular case whether Native rights had 
been ceded to the Crown, it must have been for the Governor of the colony, the only channel through 
which in a Crown colony the cession could have been made, to say whether they had been ceded or not, 
and whether the Crown had accepted such cession. No Court would have had jurisdiction to consider the 
question. The Crown itself, through its Responsible Ministers in England, might have reversed the 
action of the Governor as a matter of administration, but not as acting judicially.    
Therefore, by insisting that the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had relied on statutes 
regulating native title which were enacted after the circumstances which gave rise to the present 
case, Williams J was able to minimise the applicability of this Privy Council decision to the facts 
before him. He was therefore able to follow Stout CJ in affirming the continuing relevance of Wi 
Parata to the present case:69 
It is difficult to distinguish the present case from the case of Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington, 
which dealt with the same subject matter. The decision in that case was approved by the Privy Council 
in Tamaki v Baker, although certain dicta in the judgment were disapproved of … On the authority, 
therefore, of Wi Parata's case, and upon general principles, I think that our judgment should be for the 
defendants … 
  
68  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 670-671 Williams J. In his Protest against the Privy 
Council, where he defends the Court of Appeal's judgment in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, 
above n 3, Williams J. follows the same strategy of rejecting the relevance of Nireaha Tamaki to the issues 
at hand by insisting that the statutes upon which the Privy Council relies to affirm the Courts' jurisdiction 
over native title arose after the relevant circumstances of the Crown's grant to the Bishop of Wellington (in 
other words the subject matter of the case). As Williams J states: "At the time of the transactions in question 
there … were no statutes regulating the extinction of Native title. The Native Rights Act referred to in the 
case of Nireaha Tamaki v Baker was not passed till 1865." ("Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest 
of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 749 Williams J). 
69  Hohepa Wi Neera v The Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 671-72 Williams J. Of course, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3 was not upheld on appeal. Rather, 
the Privy Council reversed this judgment in far more direct terms than it reversed the Court of Appeal's 
1894 judgment in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, thereby giving rise to the Court of Appeal's Protest against the 
Privy Council in 1903. See Wallis v Solicitor-General for New Zealand, above n 3, 187-89.  
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C The Final Ruling in Hohepa Wi Neera 
The judgment for the defendant in Hohepa Wi Neera largely rested on the Court's response to 
the following questions stated for argument in the case:  
1. Is the plaintiff estopped or concluded by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Wi Parata 
v The Bishop of Wellington and Another?70 
7. Is the issue of the alleged Crown grant an implied declaration by the Crown that the Native title to the 
land has been extinguished?71 
8. Is the issue of the alleged Crown grant an implied declaration by the Crown that all the right, title, and 
interest of the Natives to the land is extinguished?72 
Stout CJ (Edwards and Conolly JJ concurring) answered these questions in the affirmative by 
citing Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington as the authoritative precedent on this matter.73 Williams J 
(Denniston J concurring) agreed with Stout CJ, again citing Wi Parata as the authoritative 
precedent.74 The plaintiff's claim that the Crown grant could be annulled, and the land returned to 
the original owners, on the grounds that the pre-existing native title had not been lawfully 
extinguished, was therefore denied.  
VI DID NIREAHA TAMAKI MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
Yet despite the attempts of the Court of Appeal in Hohepa Wi Neera to minimise the impact of 
Nireaha Tamaki on the Wi Parata precedent, did the Privy Council decision make a difference to 
the way in which the New Zealand Court of Appeal now approached the issue of native title? I think 
so. The extent of the difference can be seen in the fact that, although the facts of the case in Hohepa 
Wi Neera were virtually identical to those which arose in Wi Parata, the judges in Hohepa Wi Neera  
 
adjudicated on them in a very different manner to the way in which they were dealt with in that 
former case.  
 
70  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 657.  
71  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 658. 
72  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 658. 
73  As Stout CJ put it: "[A]s I have said, the decision of the Supreme Court in Wi Parata v. The Bishop of 
Wellington is a decision on the main points raised in this case, and ought to be decisive of issues 6, 7, and 
8." (Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 667 Stout CJ).   
74  As Williams J said: "On the authority, therefore, of Wi Parata's case, and upon general principles, I think 
that our judgment should be for the defendants, and that the answers to the questions stated in the case 
should be those suggested by His Honour."  (Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 672 
Williams J). 
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The very manner in which both Stout CJ and Williams J adjudicated in Hohepa Wi Neera 
reveals the profound difference which the Privy Council's judgment in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had 
made to the New Zealand judicial environment on native title. One of the central strategies of 
Prendergast CJ when confronted with the same facts as the present case some twenty-five years 
before, was to simply deny the Court's jurisdiction over the matter, on the grounds that native title 
issues involving the Crown involved acts of State and so fell within the confines of the Crown 
prerogative.75 At one point he even admitted he was interpreting a statute to exclude the Crown 
precisely because any other interpretation would deny that prerogative.76 Despite facing essentially 
the same facts in the present case, the Court of Appeal did not resort to this strategy, even though 
the Court of Appeal's obiter dicta in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington the previous year 
seemed to provide some support for doing so.77 Rather than simply accepting the Crown's 
declarations concerning native title as binding on the Court, as the Wi Parata precedent would 
require, the judges in Hohepa Wi Neera weighed the evidence for the Crown against that for the 
plaintiff before reaching a conclusion.78 Hohepa Wi Neera therefore showed that the Court of 
  
75   Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 78-79.  
76  As Prendergast CJ stated: "The Crown, not being named in the statute, is clearly not bound by it; as the Act, 
if it bound the Crown, would deprive it of a prerogative right, that namely of conclusively determining when 
the native title has been duly extinguished…." (Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, above n 1, 80).  
77  In Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, the Court of Appeal delivered obiter dicta on an amended 
statement of defence submitted by the Solicitor-General which strongly suggested that, had it been 
necessary to adjudicate on the issue, they would have given strong support to the principle that the Court has 
no jurisdiction over native title matters involving Maori tribes and the Crown. As Justice Williams put it: 
"The position appears to be somewhat as follows … The Crown … as parens patriae, is under a solemn 
obligation to protect the rights of Native owners of the soil. When, therefore, the Crown, as parens patriae, 
asserts that in that capacity it is under an obligation to Natives in respect of a property, can this Court, 
representing the Crown as parens patriae, say to the Crown, You shall not carry out this obligation …? We 
see great difficulty in holding that, in such circumstances, the Court could or ought to interfere." (Solicitor-
General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3, 686 Williams J). He adds further: "[T]he Crown therefore 
asserts that it has duties towards the Natives who ceded the land which could not be performed if the Court 
administered the trust cy-près. This would place the Court in a considerable difficulty. What the original 
rights of the Native owners were, what the bargain was between the Natives and the Crown when the 
Natives ceded the land, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to inquire into, even if it were 
clear that it had jurisdiction to do so." (Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3, 686 Williams 
J).  
78  Consequently, even though Williams J follows his line of reasoning above that in the absence of statutes 
regulating the extinguishment of native title, a Crown grant must be considered conclusive evidence of such 
extinguishment, nevertheless this is still an instance of a municipal court weighing the Crown's evidence 
against those of other parties (rather than denying the Court's jurisdiction in the face of declarations by the 
Crown). Hence Williams J's conclusion is as follows: "I think the issue of the Crown grant in 1850 is 
conclusive evidence that any native rights then existing in the land had been ceded to the Crown, and that 
the cession had been accepted by the Crown. The execution of such an instrument by the only officer who 
could accept a cession on behalf of the Crown necessarily implies that there has been a cession and that the 
Crown has accepted it." (Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 671 Williams J). Here 
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Appeal no longer automatically assumed that the Crown retained the privileged position reserved for 
it in Wi Parata, where its declaration alone could oust the jurisdiction of the Court and conclude all 
native title claims. Rather, the Court clearly claimed jurisdiction in arriving at its judgment.  
In this respect, I would fundamentally disagree with Paul McHugh's analysis of the Hohepa Wi 
Neera judgment, where he states that "… the Court of Appeal continued the Wi Parata 
characterization of Crown-Maori relations on matters concerning the traditional tribal lands as 'acts 
of state', matters of political and moral rather than legal concern."79 This is precisely what the Court 
of Appeal did not do in Hohepa Wi Neera, as any such conclusion would have forced them to refuse 
jurisdiction over the case, along the same lines as Prendergast CJ above. Indeed, as we shall see 
below, the Court of Appeal, in upholding Wi Parata in its Hohepa Wi Neera judgment, upheld it in 
its narrowest sense, concerning the specific questions of law decided in the case and affirmed by the 
Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker. It did not uphold the wider elements of the precedent 
referred to by McHugh above. 
So the biggest difference between Wi Parata and Hohepa Wi Neera is that the Court of Appeal 
accepted jurisdiction in the later case, when the Supreme Court had clearly rejected that jurisdiction, 
on the basis of the same facts, some twenty-five years before. Ironically therefore, even though the 
Court of Appeal in Hohepa Wi Neera ultimately ruled to uphold Wi Parata, it did so in terms of a 
process of adjudication very different from Wi Parata itself. Surely the difference can only be 
explained by the impact of the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, which had 
moved strongly against Wi Parata's exclusion of the jurisdiction of the municipal courts over native 
title.  
The difference made by Nireaha Tamaki v Baker is also evident in the way in which the Wi 
Parata precedent is affirmed in the present case. Previously, the New Zealand Courts had affirmed 
Wi Parata in its widest sense.80 It was on this basis that the Crown's declarations on native title were 
always accepted by the Courts as conclusive. Yet in Hohepa Wi Neera, the Wi Parata precedent is 
affirmed in its narrowest sense, in terms of the strict legal questions which it decided.81 Why? 
Because as both Stout CJ and Williams J state above, the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker 
affirmed Prendergast CJ's conclusions on these strict legal questions, but clearly rejected his wider 
  
Williams J has weighed the evidence for the Crown, rather than accepting the Crown's claims at face value, 
as the Wi Parata precedent upholding the Crown's prerogative right would require. 
79  The Maori Magna Carta, above n 10, 119. 
80  For example, see Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 488 (CA) Richmond J. However as we have seen, 
subsequent judicial authority tended to ignore the terra nullius elements of Prendergast CJ's Wi Parata 
judgment.  For one exception concerning these later authorities, see Tate, above n 7, 159-164. 
81  See Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 667 Stout CJ; 671-672 Williams J. 
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obiter dicta on native title.82 Consequently, both Stout CJ and Williams J affirmed Wi Parata on the 
only grounds made available to them by the Privy Council. Once again, this demonstrates the 
profound impact which the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had on the 
deliberations of the judges in this present case, despite their attempt to minimise its difference or its 
relevance.  
That the Court of Appeal so quickly reflected this altered landscape produced by the Privy 
Council's departure from Wi Parata is somewhat ironic given that the year after its Hohepa Wi 
Neera judgment, the Court engaged in a protest against the Privy Council whose entire sub-text was 
a defence of the Wi Parata precedent in its broad sense against the departures of the Privy Council 
in Nireaha Tamaki and Wallis v Solicitor-General (1903).83 This apparent shift from their position 
in Hohepa Wi Neera can be partially explained by the fact that in their protest, the Court of Appeal 
were defending a decision - Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington (1901) - which was delivered 
prior to Hohepa Wi Neera and therefore prior to the Court of Appeal gaining access to the Privy 
Council's judgment in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker. Further, they were also defending this decision 
from a Privy Council judgment, Wallis v Solicitor-General (1903), which went even further than 
Nireaha Tamaki v Baker in its rejection of the Wi Parata precedent.84 Nevertheless, within this 
  
82  Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 667 Stout CJ; 671-672 Williams J. Although as we 
have seen, the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki reserved judgment on the issues of Crown prerogative 
arising out of the Wi Parata judgment: see Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 381-383;  385 Lord Davey 
(PC). 
83  See "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 730 Stout 
CJ; 747, 755-56 Williams J; 757 Edwards J.  
84  As we have seen, the Privy Council's departure from the Wi Parata precedent in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker 
was qualified by the fact that it reserved judgment on the question of Crown prerogative (see Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 381-383;  385 Lord Davey (PC)). Hence it did not directly challenge the Wi 
Parata principle that native title matters involving Crown prerogative were outside the jurisdiction of the 
Courts. It was precisely this principle which the Privy Council in Wallis v Solicitor-General did challenge. 
As we have seen, in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, the Solicitor-General had provided an 
amended statement of defence in which he claimed that the terms of cession of the native land to the Crown 
precluded the land being administered in the ways suggested by the representatives for the Bishop of 
Wellington (Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3, 686 Williams J). In obiter dicta, the Court 
of Appeal responded by implicitly upholding the Wi Parata precedent, suggesting that it didn't have the 
jurisdiction to question this claim by the Solicitor-General since native title matters involving the Crown 
were arguably matters for the Crown alone, and so outside the jurisdiction of the Courts (Solicitor-General v 
Bishop of Wellington, above n 3, 686 Williams J). In Wallis v Solicitor-General, the Privy Council 
thoroughly rejected this suggestion in the most pointed terms, suggesting that it reflected extremely badly 
on the independence of the Court of Appeal: "The proposition advanced on behalf of the Crown is certainly 
not flattering to the dignity or the independence of the highest Court in New Zealand, or even to the 
intelligence of the Parliament. What has the Court to do with the executive? Where there is a suit properly 
constituted and ripe for decision, why should justice be denied or delayed at the bidding of the executive? 
Why should the executive Government take upon itself to instruct the Court in the discharge of its proper 
functions? Surely it is for the Court, not for the executive, to determine what is a breach of trust [?]" (Wallis 
v Solicitor-General, above n 3, 188). With this statement, the Privy Council was  implying that any 
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protest, the Court of Appeal's depth of commitment to Wi Parata, and its frustrations with the Privy 
Council's departure from it, are more than evident.85 
VII COLONIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
We can therefore see a clear strategy at work in the judgments of Stout CJ and Williams J in 
Hohepa Wi Neera. Faced with a new Privy Council decision on native title which effectively 
overturned much of the Wi Parata precedent – a precedent which had provided the framework for 
New Zealand judicial reflection on native title for so long – both judges adopted strategies aimed at 
minimizing the relevance of this precedent to their deliberations in the present case. In so doing, 
they were able to retain their allegiance to Wi Parata by insisting on its continuing relevance to the 
facts before them.  
But why would both judges go to such lengths to maintain the authority of Wi Parata in the face 
of Privy Council challenge? Why would they adopt strategies whose apparent purpose was to 
circumvent the judgment of a superior Court, at least in so far as that judgment related to the facts of 
the case before them? At the most immediate level, the answer lies in the material security which Wi 
Parata provided both for the Crown and for settler society in New Zealand. As we have seen, Wi 
Parata ensured that the land settlement process in New Zealand was entirely free from legal 
challenge by Maori tribes on the basis of native title. As we have seen, the centrality of this 
precedent to the stability and security of land tenure in New Zealand is demonstrated by the fact that 
senior New Zealand judges (including Stout CJ) insisted that any departure from it would produce 
instability and insecurity.86  
Consequently, against this broader background, we can understand the judgments of Stout CJ 
and Williams J in Hohepa Wi Neera as informed by a desire to defend what they saw as necessary 
for the stability and security of land settlement in New Zealand. Such a position was clearly partial 
to settler over Maori interests, because this stability and security required the maintenance of a 
precedent which denied Maori any legal grounds for asserting native title claims against the Crown. 
  
suggestion by the Crown that native title matters fall outside the jurisdiction of the Courts, due to the Crown 
prerogative powers, is not to be accepted at face-value by the Courts themselves. In other words, from the 
Privy Council's perspective, a mere declaration by the Crown concerning native title matters is no longer 
binding on the Courts, as Prendergast CJ had assumed in Wi Parata. Rather, the Privy Council implied, all 
matters involving native title and the Crown were now justiciable within the Courts. With this claim, a 
significant remnant of Wi Parata, on which the Privy Council had reserved judgment in Nireaha Tamaki v 
Baker, was overturned. From the Privy Council's perspective, the Crown could no longer assert prerogative 
powers over native title to exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts.   
85  As an example of this commitment and frustration, see "Wallis and Others v Solicitor-General, Protest of 
Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 757 Edwards J. 
86  See "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 746 Stout 
CJ; 757 Edwards J and Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 488 (CA) Richmond J; Hohepa Wi Neera v 
Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 667 Stout CJ.  
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It is this partiality which, I believe, reflects a "colonial consciousness" on the part of these judges. I 
define a "colonial consciousness" as a state of mind imbued with a fundamental commitment to 
settler interests within colonial society. Because colonial societies are defined, above all, by the 
appropriation and settlement of new land, these settler interests will be focused on land issues above 
all. It is the concern of these judges (at one point, as we have seen, openly articulated by Stout CJ) 
to maintain the stability and security of this settlement process by minimizing the extent to which it 
could be open to native title challenge, which most reflects this "colonial consciousness".87 The 
imputation of this "colonial consciousness" to the judges in Hohepa Wi Neera therefore provides us 
with some basis for explaining the motivation behind their deliberate attempts to circumvent and 
minimise the impact of the Privy Council's departure from Wi Parata, and so maintain the authority 
of that precedent to the facts before them in the present case.   
A Broader Backgrounds 
But is there any other aspect of the personal backgrounds of either Stout CJ or Williams J which 
would go further in explaining the presence of this "colonial consciousness", and therefore their 
willingness to tenaciously defend settler over Maori interests regarding native title? Sir Robert Stout 
had spent almost all of his adult life in New Zealand, having migrated there from the Shetland 
Islands in 1864 at the age of nineteen.88 He spent his working life advancing through the law and 
politics, beginning as a representative in the Otago Provincial Council in 1872 to eventually become 
Attorney-General and, in 1884, Premier of New Zealand in the Stout-Vogel Ministry, before 
accepting the position of Chief Justice in 1899.89 Indeed, most of his education and experience had 
been confined to New Zealand and he thoroughly identified with its interests.90  
Yet it is evident that Sir Robert identified New Zealand interests very much with settler 
interests. His political position, for all of his adult life, was one which divided between a liberal and 
a radical point of view, in the nineteenth century sense of both those terms.91 That is, he was 
  
87  On Stout CJ's "open articulation", see "Wallis and Others v Solicitor-General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 
April 1903", above n 3, 746 Stout CJ. 
88  Waldo Hilary Dunn and Ivor LM Richardson Sir Robert Stout: A Biography (AH and AW Reed, 
Wellington, 1961) 20-21. 
89  See Dunn and Richardson, above n 88 , 68, 96-97, 157-58; Cooke, above, n 4, 45. 
90  As Dunn and Richardson state: "For all his adult life his home had been a small colonial outpost, cut off by 
its remoteness from the United Kingdom from full participation in the cross-currents of thought of 
contemporary Europe. Unlike several of his contemporaries at the New Zealand bar, he had enjoyed no 
terms at a great university or at one of the Inns of Court in London, no personal association with the 
outstanding leaders of the legal profession, no experience outside of the country that had been his home for 
more than thirty-five years." (Dunn and Richardson, above n 88 , 160).  
91  Hence for much of the nineteenth century, "liberalism" was a broad church, due to the absence of any 
definite Labour parties on the left, and so it tended to divide between laizzez faire and progressive or even 
radical positions. Ironically, Stout straddled both. So for instance, he was fundamentally committed to free 
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committed to a wide range of progressive causes, including development, but a development which 
included the interests of the broadest sections of the population.92 In this regard, Stout CJ had a 
profound interest in land settlement issues, and consistently opposed the monopolization of land 
holdings by large private interests.93 For much of his life he advocated full state control of the land 
settlement process, and the leasing, rather than the selling, of land, to ensure that the state (with 
which he identified the general interest) received the benefit of improved land values, rather than 
private individuals.94 Consequently, his reformist position on land settlement was one which 
identified with the interests of the small settler against large private conglomerates. This did not 
mean he advocated the open dispossession of Maori. Indeed, he was quite critical of Crown policies 
regarding the public and private purchase of Maori land, as denying Maori interests, when he was 
involved in the Native Lands and Native Land Tenure Commission (better known as the Stout-
Ngata Commission) in 1907 and 1908.95 Yet regarding issues of material development, Stout CJ did 
  
thought in religion, and yet also to the legal prohibition of alcohol (see Cooke, above n 4, 45; Dunn and 
Richardson, above n 88, 29; 36; 57-58; 83; 86-88). He was committed to progressive causes such as the 
extension of the franchise and triennial parliaments, and the extension of educational opportunities for the 
broad mass of the public, including equal educational rights for women (See Dunn and Richardson, above n 
88, 27; 92; 180; 184). Indeed, at one point, his biographers, Dunn and Richardson, even refer to Stout as the 
"radical of radicals", relative to others within New Zealand political life during his time as Premier (Dunn 
and Richardson, above n 88, 97.  See also Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 104; 121). Yet on issues of 
state welfare, he adopted a laizzez-faire approach: "Stout was inclined to extend the principle of 
individualism from the unit to the group. Each man should look out for himself and should cut his coat 
according to his cloth. He believed in putting a man, so far as was possible, in a position where he could 
keep himself. He did not, however, have faith in aids and grants for relief and he had no belief in 
governmental 'coddling'. Nor did he hesitate to express his views publicly. When the unemployed asked for 
work he told them that no government had ever stated it to be its duty to provide work, and his policy was 
actuated by the simple belief that the less the government interfered in people's lives and did for them the 
better." (Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 108.  See also Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 119-20).  
However according to the authors, by the early 1890s, Stout had qualified his anti-statist views in this 
respect (see Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 145-47).   
92  See Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 26; 104. 
93  See Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 50. Dunn and Richardson state that in his native Shetlands, Sir 
Robert "… had abundant opportunity to observe the harshness of the land laws and, in particular, the 
unfortunate lot of those who occupied property at the whim of landowners … No wonder then that he 
became and remained a radical land reformer and always attached such importance to the public ownership 
of land." (Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 17).  Indeed, these authors state that from very early in his 
political career, land settlement was Sir Robert's "… first consideration, land settlement before the 
promotion of railways or any kind of public improvements." (Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 26). But it 
was land settlement within the terms of the interests of the small settler.  
94  See Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 34; 49-51; 88-89; 115. 
95  See Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 174-75; and Boast and others, above n 10, 87; and Alan Ward An 
Unsettled History: Treaty Claims in New Zealand Today (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1999) 156.  
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not see any difference between the "real" interests of Maori and those of small settlers, assuming 
that both would benefit from a similar model of development.96  
It is in the context of his commitment to "development", albeit one tempered by a radical 
insistence that it be inclusive of small settler interests, that we can understand Stout CJ's concerns 
over native title, and in particular, his unwillingness to hold that native title was cognizable within 
the Courts.97 He well knew that native title was a basis upon which Maori could challenge the 
legality of existing Crown titles , and if that were possible (as the Privy Council's judgment in 
Nireaha Tamaki v Baker seemed to imply) then, in Stout CJ's words, "… no land title in the Colony 
would be safe."98 It was not a hostility to Maori interests therefore, but rather a hostility to what 
threatened Stout CJ's conception of land development, which informed his  "colonial consciousness" 
regarding native title. 
Whereas Stout CJ was enrolled for a time as the first student at the University of Otago and later 
became a lecturer in law there, Sir Joshua Williams was a product of the English public school 
system and Cambridge.99 Like Stout CJ, he emigrated to New Zealand as a young man, and became 
very early involved in local politics, becoming a member of the Provincial Council and eventually 
  
96   This tendency to identify Maori and settler interests can be seen in the terms of reference of the 
Commission, which was concerned to "…. investigate which areas of Native land were 'unoccupied or not 
profitably occupied' and 'how such lands can best be utilized and settled in the interests of the native owners 
and the public good'." (Robert Stout and Apirana Turupa Ngata "Interim Report of the Commission 
Appointed to Inquire into the Question of Native Lands and Native Land Tenure" [1907] III AJHR G 1, 
cited in Boast and Others, above n 10, 87). These terms of reference themselves indicate the extent to which 
"profit" and "development" would inevitably be defined in European terms. As Dunn and Richardson state: 
"In many respects the most significant feature of the commission's reports was the emphasis on the 
importance of encouraging and training the Maoris to settle their own lands efficiently. The commission 
recommended that the education of Maoris should be given an agricultural bias, that model farms should be 
established and that the government should provide instructors to advise upon farm and stock management." 
(Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 174).  
97  Hence in his 1903 Protest, Stout CJ repeated his position on the exclusion of native title from the 
jurisdiction of the Courts (which he articulates in Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 665-
66 Stout CJ), as follows: "The root of title being in the Crown, the Court could not recognize Native title. 
This has been ever held to be the law in New Zealand: see [R v Symonds] decided by their Honours Sir 
William Martin, CJ, and Mr. Justice Chapman in 1847; Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, decided by their 
Honours Sir J Prendergast and Mr Justice Richmond in 1877, and other cases. Nor did the Privy Council in 
Nireaha Tamaki v Baker entirely overrule this view, though it did not approve of all the dicta of the Judges 
in Wi Parata's case." ("Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", 
above n 3, 732 Stout CJ). Stout CJ's reading of R v Symonds as consistent with the later judgment of Wi 
Parata is mistaken, and is based on a very selective interpretation of the earlier case. For a full discussion, 
see Tate, above n 7, 125-28.  
98  "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 746 Stout CJ. 
99  See Cooke, above n 4, 53-54. On Stout CJ's educational qualifications, see Dunn and Richardson, above n 
88  , 27-28; and Cooke, above n 4, 44-45.    
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Provincial Solicitor in the Canterbury district, though never rising to the level of national politics as 
Stout CJ did.100 Like Stout CJ, he also took an interest in land administration, being appointed a 
District Land Registrar, and also Registrar General of Lands, in the Canterbury region in 1871, 
before being appointed a judge of the Supreme Court in 1875.101 
By the time of Hohepa Wi Neera, Williams J. had thoroughly identified himself with a 
commitment to the Wi Parata precedent. He was a member of the Court of Appeal Bench which 
brought down the original Nireaha Tamaki decision in 1894, and which had upheld the Wi Parata 
precedent as essential to the "security of all titles in the country".102 As we have seen, it was this 
judgment which was subsequently overruled by the Privy Council in 1901. He also delivered the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of The Solicitor-General v The Bishop of Wellington 
which, in obiter dicta, once again suggested that native title matters were entirely a matter for the 
prerogative of the Crown.103 Again, as we have seen, this obiter dicta was the subject of scathing 
criticism by the Privy Council, which in turn led to the Court of Appeal's protest in 1903.104 During 
the course of this Protest, Williams J. once again defended the Wi Parata precedent as the 
authoritative precedent on native title within New Zealand law, stating:105 
It has always been held that any transactions between the Crown and the Natives relating to their title by 
occupancy were a matter for the Executive Government, and one into which the Court had no 
jurisdiction to inquire. As was laid down in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington: 'Transactions with the 
Natives for the cession of their title to the Crown are to be regarded as acts of State, and therefore are 
not examinable in any Court' … We considered, as every authority justified us in considering, that the 
root of all title was in the Crown. What the rights of any prior Native occupiers might be, or whether 
they had any rights, was a matter entirely for the conscience of the Crown. In any case they had no rights 
cognizable in this Court. Nor could this Court examine in any way what their rights were. 
  
100  See William Downie Stewart Portrait of a Judge, Sir Joshua Strange Williams PC  (Whitcome and Tombs, 
Wellington, 1945) 19, 20. Like Stout CJ, Sir Joshua Williams also held the position of Chancellor of a 
university, though in Williams' case this was the University of Otago, whereas Stout held the chancellorship 
of the University of New Zealand (See Stewart, 95; Dunn and Richardson, above n 88, 185).   
101  See Stewart, above n 100, 20. See also Oscar Thorwald Johan Alpers Cheerful Yesterdays (Capper Press, 
Christchurch, 1984) 198-99; Cooke, above n 4, 54. William J's father, Joshua Williams QC, had also been 
involved in land law, and another Judge of the New Zealand Supreme Court, Oscar Thorwald Johan Alpers, 
has referred to Williams Senior's textbook on property law, Law of Real Property, as "the classical authority 
upon that topic" (Alpers, 198).  
102  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7, 488 (CA) Richmond J. 
103  See Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3, 686 Williams J. 
104  See Wallis v Solicitor-General, above n 3, 188 (PC); "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of 
Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 730 Stout CJ; 747, 755-56 Williams J; 757 Edwards J. . 
105  "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 754-55 
Williams J. 
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While Williams J's statement was certainly an accurate articulation of the Wi Parata precedent, 
his claim that "every authority" justified the Court of Appeal in holding to this precedent was in fact 
less than accurate.106 There were two early native title cases in New Zealand which preceded Wi 
Parata and which held, contrary to the later judgment, that native title was cognizable within 
municipal courts.107 Williams J's willingness to overlook these cases is similar to Stout CJ's 
  
106  Williams J also made another claim in his protest concerning the unanimity of authority on native title in 
New Zealand when, again discussing the Court of Appeal's judgment in Solicitor-General v Bishop of 
Wellington, he states: "Whether, however, we were right or wrong, there was certainly an unbroken  current 
of authority … that the Native occupiers had no right to their land cognizable in a Court of law, and that 
having no such right themselves they could not transfer any right to others." ("Wallis and Others v Solicitor 
General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 750,Williams J). 
107  Hence as early as 1847, the New Zealand Supreme Court brought down a judgment in R v Symonds, during 
the course of which Chapman J stated: "The intercourse of civilized nations, and especially of Great Britain, 
with the aboriginal Natives of America and other countries, during the last two centuries, has gradually led 
to the adoption and affirmation by the Colonial Courts of certain established principles of law applicable to 
such intercourse. Although these principles may at times have been lost sight of, yet animated by the 
humane spirit of modern times, our colonial Courts, and the Courts of such of the United States of America 
as have adopted the common law of England, have invariably affirmed and supported them; so that at this 
day, a line of judicial decision, the current of legal opinion, and above all, the settled practice of the colonial 
Governments, have concurred to clothe with certainty and precision what would otherwise have remained 
vague and unsettled. These principles are not the new creation or invention of the colonial Courts. They 
flow not from what an American writer has called the 'vice of judicial legislation'. They are in fact to be 
found among the earliest settled principles of our law; and they are in part deduced from those higher 
principles, from charters made in conformity with them, acquiesced in even down to the charter of our own 
Colony; and from the letter of treaties with Native tribes, wherein those principles have been asserted and 
acted upon." (R v Symonds, above n 58 , 388).  
That native title was central to the legal principles that Chapman J refers to in his statement above is made 
clear later in his judgment when he states: "Whatever may be the opinion of jurists as to the strength or 
weakness of the Native title, whatsoever may have been the past vague notions of the Natives of this 
country, whatever may be their present clearer and still growing conception of their dominion over land, it 
cannot be too solemnly asserted that it is entitled to be respected, that it cannot be extinguished (at least in 
times of peace) otherwise than by the free consent of the Native occupiers. But for their protection, and for 
the sake of humanity, the Government is bound to maintain, and the Courts to assert, the Queen's exclusive 
right to extinguish it. It follows from what has been said, that in solemnly guaranteeing the Native title, and 
in securing what is called the Queen's pre-emptive right, the Treaty of Waitangi, confirmed by the Charter 
of the Colony, does not assert either in doctrine or in practice any thing new and unsettled." (R v Symonds, 
above n 58, 390).  
Some twenty-five years later, Arney CJ of the Court of Appeal brought down a similar ruling on native title 
which equally differed from the later Wi Parata judgment. During the course of this ruling, Arney CJ said: 
"No doubt there is a sense in which 'Native lands' are not 'Crown lands'. The Crown is bound, both by the 
common law of England and by its own solemn engagements, to a full recognition of Native proprietary 
right. Whatever the extent of that right by established native custom appears to be, the Crown is bound to 
respect it." (In re 'The Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871' (1872) 2 NZCA 41, 49). 
In both of these judgments therefore, native title is held to be recognised by common law and so cognisable 
in the Courts.  
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tendency to identify at least one of them as being in agreement with Wi Parata.108 In doing so, both 
gave  a misleading impression that the authority of Wi Parata was indeed buttressed by all extant 
judicial authority in New Zealand. Such misrepresentation, whether intentional or not, again reflects 
the agonistic extent to which these judges were willing to go in defence of this precedent.109 
B A "Nationalist" Consciousness? 
But is it a "colonial consciousness" which best explains the Court of Appeal's tenacious 
commitment to Wi Parata, in the face of the Privy Council's departure from that precedent? Or is 
this tenacity better explained as arising from very different motives – perhaps from a nascent 
nationalism concerned to encourage New Zealand independence by upholding local precedents 
against those emanating from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? Certainly in the wake of 
the Privy Council's ruling in Wallis v Solicitor General, and the official protest this engendered, 
Chief Justice Stout was much more willing to articulate a position critical and hostile to the Privy 
Council. But was it one articulated in nationalist terms – entailing the need for New Zealand 
autonomy and independence from that imperial body? In the context of the protest, Stout CJ 
certainly criticised what he saw as the Privy Council's ignorance of New Zealand law.110 It is on the 
basis of this alleged ignorance that Stout CJ then felt justified in questioning the continued 
usefulness of the Privy Council for New Zealand as follows:111 
The matter is really a serious one. A great Imperial judicial tribunal sitting in the capital of the Empire, 
dispensing justice even to the meanest of British subjects in the uttermost parts of the earth, is a great 
and noble ideal. But if that tribunal is not acquainted with the laws it is called upon to interpret or 
administer, it may unconsciously become the worker of injustice. And if such should unfortunately 
happen, that Imperial spirit that is the true bond of union amongst His Majesty's subjects must be 
weakened. At present we in New Zealand are, so far as the Privy Council is concerned, in an unfortunate 
position. It has shown that it knows not our statutes, or our conveyancing terms, or our history. What the 
remedy may be, or can be, for such a state of things, it is not at present within my province to suggest.  
We can see, therefore, that in the context of his protest, Stout CJ was quite willing to criticise 
what he saw as the deleterious practical effect of Privy Council appeals on New Zealand law. But 
  
108  Hence in his Protest, Stout CJ cites R v Symonds and Wi Parata as consistent, rather than contrary, 
precedents on native title (see "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 
1903", above n 3, 732 Stout CJ). He did the same in Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop of Wellington, above n 6, 
665-666 Stout CJ. See also Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General (1912) 32 NZLR 321, 344 Stout CJ.    
109  I have explained in some detail elsewhere what I believe are the reasons for this consistent misreading of 
these early native title cases, relative to Wi Parata. See Tate, above n 7, 130-64.  
110  "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 732, 737, 743, 
745 Stout CJ. 
111 "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 746 Stout CJ. 
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this practical effect was a product of what he perceived as Privy Council ignorance. At this point, it 
does not seem that he was openly articulating a position critical of the Privy Council on "nationalist" 
grounds, as inconsistent with New Zealand independence. However the following year, in an article 
in the Commonwealth Law Review, Stout CJ did precisely this. He referred to what he believed was 
the "anomaly" of the Australasian colonies retaining appellate appeals to the Privy Council when 
they had achieved self-government in the areas of legislation and administration, suggesting that 
such appeals were inconsistent with such self-government and the independence it implied.112  
Indeed, Stout CJ goes so far as to claim that the retention of such appellate appeals is "illogical":113 
Seeing that the fullest rights of legislation and administration have been granted to the Colonies, it is 
illogical that the fullest rights of settling legal disputes should not also have been granted to them. 
Surely the making of laws, and the administering of Government affairs are as important as the 
interpreting of the laws we ourselves have made [?]  
Stout CJ reiterated in this article the problems with the Privy Council which he referred to in his 
protest – not least its distance and alleged ignorance of much colonial law, and the delay and 
expense of appeal.114 Yet the "nationalist" dimension which he added in this article goes further 
  
112  As Stout CJ states: "The Australasian Colonies have representative and responsible government. The Royal 
will in legislation … is expressed through the different Colonial Parliaments. The Royal will in 
administration is expressed through the different Colonial Executives. Regarding these two functions the 
power and the responsibility of the Colonies are complete. … The Colonial Legislatures are almost 
supreme. The only bills reserved by a Governor are those in which Imperial interests are affected. It is true 
the Sovereign has a veto power which may be exercised to disallow a Statute within two years of its 
passing, but this veto has been so rarely exercised that it is almost obsolete through non-use. The laws of a 
Colony can only be altered by the Legislature of that Colony. The Parliament of Britain would never 
attempt to interfere with the domestic legislation of a self-governing Colony. This is so taken for granted 
that it has passed beyond the region of discussion. In administration the same right of self-government in all 
Colonial concerns is so recognized that the matter is settled. No one suggests any alteration. When, 
however, we come to inquire what is the position regarding the Royal will in Judicature, we will find that 
matters are not in so satisfactory a state. These Colonies have their local tribunals from Justices of Peace 
Courts to Appeal Courts. There is, however, still remaining a final Court of Appeal that existed before self-
government was given to the Colonies. The King in his British Council – his Privy Council – hears appeals 
from his subjects beyond the shores of England. It is a survival of the old Colonial system. The final judicial 
tribunal of the Colonies is not a Colonial institution. The King, on the advice of his British Ministry, 
appoints the Judges that finally interpret Colonial Laws and who, in the last resort, administer justice in the 
Colonies. It is an anomaly in our Constitution."   (Robert Stout "Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies" 
(September – October 1904) Commonwealth LR 3-4) ["Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies"].  
113  "Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies", above n 112, 4. Perhaps with tongue somewhat in cheek, Stout CJ 
goes on to locate the root of this illogicality in the English character: "The English, it is said, are not, like 
the French, a logical people. The existence of the final Colonial Court of Appeal sitting in London, with 
Judges not appointed by the Colonies, is a proof of the statement." ("Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies", 
above n 112, 4). 
114  Hence he states: "The present system is often a denial of justice to many litigants on account of delay, cost, 
and the ignorance of the external Judges of what our laws have been, and are, and of want of acquaintance 
with our environment." ("Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies", above n 112, 13. See also "Appellate 
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than the protest and, in addition to his claim above that appellate appeals to the Privy Council are 
inconsistent with self-government, he argues that they are also harmful to the spirit of independence 
which such self-government is meant to instill:115 
Supposing, however, it were admitted that Appeal Court Judges in Australasia could not be expected to 
have the ability or learning of the members of the Judicial Committee, is that a reason for maintaining 
this external tribunal as an ultimate Court of Appeal? Did we ever see a child learning to walk? Its legs 
and arms were free, not bandaged. It was not always led. It tried, and tried again to go alone, and it had 
many falls before it succeeded. We cannot expect a young nation to be equal to one which has centuries 
of civilization behind it, and whose institutions are old and deemed sacred. But is the young nation never 
to go alone? Is it always to be under tutelage? 
And Stout CJ concludes his article on the same note, warning:116 
The psychological effect of dependence on some external power for the performance of our highest 
duties as citizens of these new nations should … not be lost sight of. 
So in his criticisms of the Privy Council in the Commonwealth Law Review, Stout CJ was 
clearly articulating a position which manifested a distinct concern with New Zealand independence, 
and the impact of Privy Council appeals on this. But can this same "nationalist" consciousness also 
explain his willingness over the previous two years to uphold the local native title precedent of Wi 
Parata in the face of Privy Council rulings departing from it? As we shall see below, there are 
strong grounds for holding that it cannot. 
Within his protest, Williams J also questioned the continuing usefulness of the Privy Council for 
New Zealand, though again, not in terms of an explicit expression of nationalist consciousness, but 
  
Tribunals for the Colonies", above n 112, 4-5). For a similar reference to the perceived problems of the 
Privy Council, concerning its knowledge of colonial laws, see Robert Stout "Is the Privy Council a 
Legislative Body?" (1905) 21 LQR 10 ["Is the Privy Council a Legislative Body?"]. 
115  "Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies", above n 112, 7. 
116 "Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies", above n 112, 13. Stout CJ did not see this assertion of Australasian 
independence, in the form of a colonial break from the Privy Council, as inconsistent with the need for unity 
of Empire, much discussed at the time. This is because he did not see the Privy Council as a source of that 
unity. As Stout CJ put it: "The retaining of the Judicial Committee has been urged on the ground that a 
Court sitting in London as the ultimate Court of Appeal for the Colonies is a 'Link of Empire'. I hope never 
to see our Empire broken up. It is better for our race and for the world that the Empire should subsist and be 
powerful and strong. How can it be suggested that a Court sitting in London, determining ten, twenty or 
thirty cases a year for the Colonies, can keep those Colonies united to the Motherland? Is it not more likely 
to cause disagreements than to promote peace? If the questions that were relegated to this Central Court 
were Imperial, and not domestic, much might be said in defence of the argument. No one ventures to 
suggest that the settling of our domestic concerns in London by legislation or by administration would tend 
to preserve the unity of the Empire, and if not, how can it be said that the settling of some of our domestic 
legal matters by a Court will have that tendency?" ("Appellate Tribunals for the Colonies", above n 112, 9).  
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rather in terms of his perception of the immediate failings of the Privy Council, as revealed in its 
criticisms of the Court of Appeal in the Wallis judgment.117 Williams J also followed Stout CJ in 
pointing to the issue of delays, and ignorance of New Zealand law, which he also believed had been 
displayed by the Privy Council.118 Yet in the passage below, he does in fact end with an implicit 
assertion of nationalist consciousness, by referring to the Privy Council judges as "strangers" and 
suggesting that the ultimate obligations of the judges of the Court of Appeal are to New Zealand, 
not the Privy Council:119 
I have had the honour of being a Judge of this Court for more than twenty-eight years. I have seen 
Governments come and go, but never have I known any Government attempt in the slightest degree to 
interfere with the independence of the Court. Nor have I ever heard it suggested that this Court, in the 
exercise of its judicial functions, has shown a want of independence or a subservience to the Executive 
Government … No suggestion of the kind has ever been made here. It has been reserved for four 
strangers sitting 14,000 miles away to make it. It is to our fellow-citizens in this Colony that we are 
responsible for our judicial conduct. If the Court retains the confidence of the people of the Colony, it is 
sufficient. 
The echoes of the Court of Appeal's protest did indeed resonate in England, and made some 
impact there.120 Indeed, according to the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, the protest initiated 
  
117  See "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 746-47, 
755-56 Williams J.   
118  As Williams J states: "That the decisions of this Court should continue to be subject to review by a higher 
Court is of the utmost importance. The knowledge that a decision can be reviewed is good alike for Judges 
and litigants. Whether, however, they should be reviewed by the Judicial Committee as at present 
constituted is a question worthy of consideration. That Court, by its imputations in the present case, by the 
ignorance it has shown in this and other cases of our history, of our legislation, and of our practice, and by 
its long-delayed judgments, has displayed every characteristic of an alien tribunal." ("Wallis and Others v 
Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 756 Williams J).  
119 "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 755-56 
Williams J. However it should be noted that, beyond the immediate issue of the Privy Council, Williams J 
was an Empire loyalist, at times to an almost jingoistic degree. Hence the New Zealand lawyer, William 
Downie Stewart, who knew Williams J personally, gives the following account of the latter's position during 
the Boer War, when Williams J gave a speech at a mass meeting of citizens in Dunedin. As Stewart states: 
"The Judge's speech is still remembered by those of my generation, because of his picture of the grave and 
momentous issues involved in the war – the danger to South Africa, and to our prestige in India and the Far 
East – and his appeal for unity. Amidst resounding cheers, he denounced those who wished to discuss the 
merits of the war and where the blame for it lay. 'The time for that has past', he cried. 'It may come again; it 
will come again, when all is over. But now if any one says to you 'But I don't approve of this war', then there 
is only one answer, 'Sir, you have got to approve of it. (Renewed cheering). When your mother is in trouble, 
it is your duty to help her, even though she may to some extent have brought the trouble on herself'." 
(Stewart, above n 100, 82-83). 
120  As William Downie Stewart has recorded: "This powerful protest made a sensation not only in New 
Zealand but in legal circles in England. I happened to be in London at the time and attended a Bar dinner at 
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a process of agitation that eventually had a reformist outcome, when it was arranged that "… in 
hearing cases remitted from dominion courts the Privy Council should, if possible, have sitting with 
it a judge from the dominion interested."121 The result was the ironic outcome that, for all their 
criticisms of the Privy Council, both Stout CJ and Williams J were eventually elected to preside on 
this body themselves – Williams J in 1913 and Stout CJ in 1921.122  
C Whose Consciousness? 
Yet can the articulation of a "nationalist" consciousness in their criticisms of the Privy Council 
explain the effort to which these Court of Appeal judges went in defending the Wi Parata 
precedent? I don't think so. Firstly, much of the "nationalist" consciousness articulated above was 
motivated by the protest, which in turn was motivated by the statements of the Privy Council in 
Wallis v Solicitor-General.123 Certainly the protest was as much a defence of the Wi Parata 
precedent as it was a protest against the injudicious use of language, and aspersions cast upon the 
Court of Appeal, by the Privy Council.124 But as we have seen, the Court of Appeal had shown just 
as much willingness to uphold Wi Parata prior to Wallis and prior to the protest.125 Indeed, the 
Court of Appeal's Hohepa Wi Neera judgment was delivered prior to the Privy Council's judgment 
in Wallis and therefore prior to the protest it engendered, so any "nationalist" spirit arising from the 
  
which many distinguished judges were present. I sat between two KC's who questioned me about the 
incident, and expressed astonishment that we still acquiesced in the practice of appeals to the Privy 
Council." (Stewart, above n 100, 90).  
121  Guy Hardy Scholefield (ed) A Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (Department of Internal Affairs, 
Wellington, 1940) 342. 
122  See Scholefied, above n 121, 342; 514.  
123  Indeed, any "nationalist" consciousness which the protest engendered seems to be fairly derivative, and 
parasitical, on a prior  "colonial" consciousness. In other words, it seems that it was the frustrations which 
their "colonial" consciousness experienced, in the face of the threats to the Wi Parata precedents, which led 
the Court of Appeal judges to express wider "nationalist" sentiments suggesting a need for greater 
independence from the Privy Council. However whether the protest engendered, or indeed reflected, a 
"colonial" or "nationalist" consciousness (and I suggest it reflected the former much more than the latter) it 
clearly did not reflect a belief on the part of  New Zealand lawyers that they were "umbilically connected 
both historically and doctrinally to the British Constitution" as Paul McHugh has suggested - see Paul 
McHugh "A History of Crown Sovereignty in New Zealand" in Andrew Sharp and Paul McHugh (eds) 
Histories, Power and Loss. Uses of the Past – A New Zealand Commentary (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, 2001) 197. Indeed, even the concept of a "colonial consciousness" suggests the possibility of a 
significant "independence" of sorts from British legal institutions and values, since as we have seen, this 
consciousness can give rise to interests and values very much at odds with those emanating from an imperial 
body like the Privy Council, and can lead in turn to demands for greater independence from these imperial 
bodies imposing such values.    
124  See "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 730 Stout 
CJ; 747, 755-56 Williams J; 757 Edwards J. 
125  See Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 7; Solicitor-General v The Bishop of Wellington, above n 7 .  
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protest cannot explain the agonistic desire of the judges in Hohepa Wi Neera to defend Wi Parata. 
Stout CJ's later statements make it clear that he saw the Privy Council's departure from Wi Parata as 
a threat.126 But not a threat to the "nationalist" independence of New Zealand. Rather, a threat to the 
stability and security of land settlement in that country. In other words, if any "consciousness" 
informed the Court of Appeal's commitment to Wi Parata, and the tenacity it displayed in its 
defence in the wake of the Privy Council's rulings, it was a colonial and not a nationalist 
consciousness. 
D The 1912 Case 
Indeed, further evidence that it was not a "nationalist" concern with New Zealand independence 
which informed the Court of Appeal's desire to defend local precedents on native title against the 
Privy Council, is provided by the Court of Appeal's later judgment on native title in the 1912 case of 
Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General.127 Here, the Court of Appeal swung full circle and 
ultimately affirmed what had been the Privy Council's position on native title in Nireaha Tamaki 
and Wallis v Solicitor-General – that contrary to Wi Parata, native title did fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Courts and the Crown could be subject to that jurisdiction.128 The Court of 
Appeal engaged in this about-face despite the fact that, in the wake of the Privy Council's decision 
in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker and Wallis v Solicitor-General, the New Zealand Parliament had passed 
a series of statutes expressly designed to give statutory enforcement to the Wi Parata precedent, 
thereby rendering the Privy Council's common law judgments to the contrary irrelevant as a 
determination of New Zealand law.129  
  
126  See "Wallis and Others v Solicitor General, Protest of Bench and Bar, 25 April 1903", above n 3, 746 Stout 
CJ. 
127  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108. 
128  See Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 345 Stout CJ; 348 Williams J; 352 Edwards J; 354 
Copper J; 358 Chapman J.    
129  We have seen above that, according to Paul McHugh, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Land Titles 
Protection Act 1902 in response to the Privy Council judgment in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (see The Maori 
Magna Carta, above n 10, 118). The Land Titles Protection Act 1902 was 'consolidated' into the Land Titles 
Protection Act 1908, which in turn was repealed by the Native Land Act 1909 (my thanks to Alan Edwards, 
Law Librarian at the University of Otago, for this legislative history). Consequently, the 1909 statute was a 
legacy of the legislative attempts to enshrine the Wi Parata precedent in statute, thereby rendering void any 
Privy Council departures from that ruling. The evidence that the Native Land Act 1909 was widely 
perceived as reversing the Privy Council's departure from Wi Parata is provided by the Solicitor-General in 
the Tamihana Korokai case. In presenting the evidence for the Crown, the Solicitor-General alleged that the 
provisions of the Native Land Act 1909 would ensure that the decision of the Privy Council in Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker could no longer apply, because the relevant piece of legislation which the Privy Council had 
relied upon for upholding native title claims in that case (the Native Rights Act 1865) had purportedly been 
repealed by the Native Land Act 1909 (See Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108  , 332 
Solicitor-General). Indeed, he goes further and argues that the Privy Council's decision would now be 
"prohibited" by section 88 of the Native Land Act 1909 (Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 
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Indeed, it was on the basis of one of these statutes (the Native Land Act 1909) that Stout CJ, in 
Tamihana Korokai, was able to hold that the Crown was subject to judicial determination on native 
title. This 1912 case involved a native title claim against the Crown to the bed of Lake Rotorua, 
once again raising the question of whether the municipal courts had the authority to bind the Crown 
over to the Native Land Court for a determination of the claim.130 Sections 84 and 85 of the Native 
Land Act 1909 had expressly tried to uphold the Wi Parata precedent that the Crown was not 
subject to the determination of the Courts on native title.  Section 84 stated:131 
Save so far as otherwise expressly provided in any other Act the Native customary title to land shall not 
be available or enforceable as against His Majesty the King by any proceedings in any Court or in any 
other manner. 
However prior to the passing of the Native Land Act 1909, the parties to the Tamihana Korokai  
case had reached an agreement whereby the Solicitor-General agreed to waive "… any objection or 
defence which might be based on the provisions of section 84 of that Act … except in so far as these 
provisions may be held to be merely declaratory of the law as existing before the passing of the said 
Act."132 Consequently, the 1912 native title case against the Crown was able to go ahead, despite 
the strictures of s 84.  
  
108, 332 Solicitor-General). Section 88 states, in part, "No action or other proceeding other than a 
proceeding by or on behalf of the Crown under the last preceding subsection shall be brought in any Court 
by any person for recovery of the possession of customary land. …" (Native Land Act 1909 9 Edw VII 15, s 
88).  The Solicitor-General's evidence indicates the extent to which the Native Land Act 1909 was widely 
perceived, at least within government circles, as reversing the trend on native title which had been 
established by the Privy Council decisions in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker and Wallis v Solicitor-General, and 
instead re-asserting the authority of the Crown over all native title claims, as had originally been guaranteed 
by Prendergast CJ in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington.      
130  See Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 323. Indeed Stout CJ reduced the matters raised in 
this case to this issue alone, stating: "The point in dispute between the parties is a narrow one. The plaintiff 
contends that he has a statutory right to go to the Native Land Court claiming under the Native Land Act a 
freehold title [in return for his alleged native title]. The Solicitor-General contends that if he, as Solictor-
General, says the land - that is, the bed of Lake Rotorua - is Crown land, that concludes the matter, and the 
Native Land Court cannot proceed to make any inquiries as to whether the land is Native customary land. 
That is the matter in contention, and it appears to me that it is the only question that this Court has at present 
to decide." (Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 338 Stout CJ).  
131  Native Land Act 1909, s 84. 
132  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 326 (emphasis added). While the Solicitor-General in 
Tamihana Korokai agreed to waive any defence based on section 84 of the Native Land Act 1909, 
nevertheless in his statement to the Court, the Solicitor-General (in person) still relied on the Wi Parata 
precedent as the basis of the Crown's defence. He stated: "The nature of Native customary title has been 
considered in many cases … and we ask the Court to confirm and ratify the principle acted on in those 
cases. That principle is - Native title is not available in any manner and for any purpose against the Crown. 
As against the Crown it is not a legal title at all." (Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 331 
Solicitor-General). The Solicitor-General then concluded by asserting the Crown's right to determine native 
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Section 85 of the Native Land Act 1909 nevertheless continued in the spirit of Wi Parata by 
statutorily enforcing Prendergast CJ's claim that a mere declaration of the Crown concerning native 
title is binding on the Courts:133 
A Proclamation by the Governor that any land vested in His Majesty the King is free from the Native 
customary title shall in all Courts and in all proceedings be accepted as conclusive proof of the fact so 
proclaimed. 
In Tamihana Korokai,  the Solicitor-General then gave evidence to the Crown upholding this 
principle that the declaration of the Crown was sufficient to nullify all native title claims against the 
Crown, stating:134 
… Native title is not available in any manner and for any purpose against the Crown. As against the 
Crown it is not a legal title at all. If, therefore, any dispute exists as to whether the land is native 
customary land or Crown land the ipse dixit of the Crown is conclusive and the question cannot be 
litigated in this or any other Court. This is the principle that has dominated all Native land law since the 
foundation of the colony: See Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington [3 NZ Jur NS SC 72 at p. 78]; Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker [12 NZ LR 483 at p. 488]. 
The Solicitor-General however, apparently believed that his own ipse dixit, as the Law Officer 
of the Crown, was sufficient to determine the matter for the Crown. In other words, it appears from 
the record of the case that the Solicitor-General was asserting that his declaration that the land in 
question was Crown land, free from native title, would (as representative of the Crown in this 
  
title claims by mere declaration: "The conclusiveness of a claim by the Crown extends to all cases, whether 
the claim is based on cession, abandonment, confiscation, or any other ground, and the claim is not 
examinable by this Court." (Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 334-35 Solicitor-General).  
133  Native Land Act 1909, s 85. The Act therefore guaranteed the security of all Crown grants and other Crown 
titles from native title challenge. As section 86 states: "No Crown grant, Crown lease, or other alienation or 
disposition of land by the Crown, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall in any Court 
or in any proceedings be questioned or invalidated or in any manner affected by reason of the fact that the 
Native customary title to that land has not been duly extinguished." (Native Land Act 1909, s 86). However 
the Native Land Act 1909 did not nullify the legal possibility of native title itself, which would have 
produced a terra nullius outcome. Rather, native title was recognised within the statute. The statute simply 
held that native title was not effective against the Crown in any instance where the Crown decided to refuse 
native title claims (see s 85). This recognition of native title is evident in section 90 of the Act, which 
followed previous Acts in reserving to the Native Land Court the " … exclusive jurisdiction to investigate 
the title to customary land, and to determine the relative interests of the owners thereof." (Native Land Act 
1909, s 90). 
134  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 331 Solicitor-General. An ipse dixit is "a dogmatic 
assertion made on the unsupported authority of the speaker." (Peter Edward Nygh and Peter J Butt (eds) 
Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary (Butterworths, Sydney, 1997) 636). In other words, the Solicitor-
General is claiming that the mere assertion by the Crown, as represented by the Solicitor-General in this 
case, ought to be sufficient to legally determine that a disputed piece of land is Crown land unencumbered 
by native title.    
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matter) nullify the contending native title claims in this case.135 Stout CJ rejected this claim as 
follows:136 
The Native Land Act, 1909, has various sections dealing with the customary land of the Maoris - viz., 
sections 84, 85, 86, and 87. What was the need of such sections if a mere declaration by a Law Officer 
of the Crown was all that was necessary to say that the land claimed as Native customary land was 
Crown land? 
He continued:137 
I know of no statutory authority that the Attorney-General as Attorney-General, or the Solicitor-General 
as Solicitor-General, has to declare that land is Crown land. The Attorney-General and the Solicitor-
General are both high officers of State. They are legal officers, and they can appear as solicitors or 
counsel for the Crown, but there their functions and powers end. Their statement as to what is Crown 
property, unless made in accordance with some statutory power, is of no avail. If in an action they put in 
a plea to that effect it would have to be proved like any other pleading of a party to the action. 
In coming to this conclusion, Stout CJ was following (without actually citing) the ruling  of the 
Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, where Lord Davey, delivering the judgment of the Court, 
stated that "[i]n a constitutional country the assertion of title by the Attorney-General in a Court of 
Justice can be treated as pleading only and requires to be supported by evidence."138 We can see 
therefore the extent to which Stout CJ's affirmation of the Privy Council view moves beyond 
previous New Zealand precedent on this matter. For instance, as we have seen, the Court of Appeal 
in 1901, in obiter dicta attached to its judgment in Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, arrived 
at an entirely contrary opinion.  On the strength of a mere suggestion by the Solicitor-General in an 
amended statement of defence that obligations had arisen between the Crown and a particular Maori 
tribe involving the cession of land, the Court suggested that such a declaration by the Crown would 
  
135  Williams J asserted that the position of the Solicitor-General was as follows: "The contention of the 
Solicitor-General is that in all cases where land is claimed by Natives to be held by them under their 
customs and usages, and they seek to have their titles ascertained by the Native Land Court … the Solicitor-
General, by virtue of the prerogative right of the Crown, and apart from any statutory authority, could at any 
time step in and prevent proceedings being taken or continued." (Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, 
above n 108, 346 Williams J. See also Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 348-49; 351-52 
Edwards J; 358 Chapman J). 
136  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 344 Stout CJ. 
137  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 345 Stout CJ. See also Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-
General, above n 108, 346 Williams J; 358 Chapman J. 
138  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 381. However Justice Chapman, in coming to the same conclusion in 
the present case, directly quotes the Privy Council's decision in Nireaha Tamaki as authority for his view: 
see Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 358 Chapman J. 
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be binding on the Court, leaving it no jurisdiction to interfere.139 It was this point of view which 
was so resoundingly rejected by the Privy Council in Wallis v Solicitor-General.140 Hence we see 
the extent to which Stout CJ, and his concurring judges in the 1912 case, had  moved to embrace the 
Privy Council position on native title which they had so thoroughly criticised and evaded only nine 
years before.  
Stout CJ's rejection of the Solicitor-General's claim above meant that he was then able to uphold 
the plaintiff's native title claim against the Crown, despite the fact that this was clearly contrary to 
the intentions of the 1909 Act. In denying the authority of the Solicitor-General to determine the 
issue of native title merely by his own declaration, Stout CJ insisted that there were only a specified 
number of ways that native title claims against the Crown could be "nullified", thereby preventing 
any further investigation into the native title:141 
There are, in my opinion, only three things that can prevent the Native Land Court entering on an 
inquiry as to such customary title - 1, a Proclamation of the Governor under a statute, such as has been 
provided in many Acts, and is so provided in section 85 of the Native Land Act, 1909; 2, a prohibition 
by the Governor under section 100 of the Native Land Act, 1909; 3, proof that the land has been ceded 
by the true owners, or that a Crown grant has been issued. 
Given that none of these grounds were established by the Crown in the case, Stout CJ concluded 
that there was not sufficient proof to determine that the native title to the bed of Lake Rotorua, if it 
existed, had been extinguished. Consequently, Stout CJ ruled that the claimants had a right to take 
their case to the Native Land Court to determine the status of the native title against the Crown. 
Such a conclusion is rather ironic, given that it uses the Native Land Act 1909 to reach conclusions 
contrary to the intentions of the Act itself. Stout CJ insisted that the Act established strict procedures 
for the extinguishment of native title claims by the Crown, and then argued that because the Crown 
has not abided by these procedures in the present case, native title claims could be instituted against 
the Crown in the Native Land Court – the very outcome the Act was designed to avoid. Hence Stout 
CJ concluded as follows:142 
What the customary title to the bed of Lake Rotorua may be must be considered and determined by the 
only Court in New Zealand that has jurisdiction to deal with Native titles - the Native Land Court … 
  
139 See Solicitor-General v Bishop of Wellington, above n 3, 686 Williams J. 
140  See Wallis v Solicitor-General, above n 3, 187; 188 (PC).  
141  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 345 Stout CJ. Section 100 of the Native Land Act 
1909 stated: "In respect of any area of customary land the Governor may, at any time and for any reason 
which he thinks fit, by Order in Council prohibit the Native Land Court or the Appellate Court from 
proceeding to ascertain the title to that land or to make a freehold order in respect thereof; and no freehold 
order made in breach of any such prohibition shall be of any force or effect."  
142  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 345-46 Stout CJ.  
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[T]he plaintiff and his people have a right to go to the Native Land Court to have their title investigated, 
and … the Native Land Court can only be prevented from performing its statutory duty, first, under the 
Native Land Act; or, second, on proof in that Court that the lands are Crown lands freed from the 
customary title of the Natives; or third, that there is a Crown title to the bed of the lake. 
With this statement, Stout CJ was effectively recognizing the altered situation on native title 
produced by the Privy Council's ruling in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker that, on the basis of the Native 
Rights Act 1865, the New Zealand judicial authorities "… are bound to recognize the fact of the 
'rightful possession and occupation of the Natives' until extinguished in accordance with law in any 
action in which such title is involved, and (as has been seen) means are provided for the 
ascertainment of such a title."143 Stout CJ still upheld the Wi Parata principle that in terms of 
common law, "… Native customary title was a kind of tenure that the Court could not deal with."144  
Yet it was clear that he now assumed, in line with the Privy Council, that there was a statutory basis 
for the municipal courts, in some circumstances, to bind the Crown over to the Native Land Court 
and force it to submit to investigation on native title matters (albeit a statutory basis dating from 
1909, not 1865).145 Once again, therefore, we see the extent to which the 1912 judgment of the 
Court of Appeal in Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General was a strong move away from the legacy 
of Wi Parata, and a decided step in accordance with the Privy Council.146 
  
143  Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, above n 3, 383 (PC).  
144  Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108, 344 Stout CJ.  
145 However we should not exaggerate the effects of this statutory recognition of native title. As we have seen, 
the import of the 1909 legislation was to uphold the Wi Parata precedent, and so protect the Crown from 
unwanted native title claims. It was only the peculiar circumstances of the case, where the Court of Appeal 
could find that the Crown had not abided by the lawful provisions for the extinguishment of native title, 
which allowed the Court of Appeal in Tamihana Korokai to bind the Crown over to the Native Land Court. 
In most circumstances, the 1909 legislation, and its successor statutes, would be an effective statutory bar to 
such an outcome. The result was that in future, native title claims in New Zealand focused on those areas 
which were deemed to fall outside this land legislation, such as coastal foreshores and river-beds. 
146  However Paul McHugh has pointed to the highly face-saving way in which Stout CJ was able to achieve 
this purpose in the 1912 case. In the Nireaha Tamaki judgment, the Privy Council had relied on the Native 
Rights Act 1865 as the source of statutory recognition of native title. In the 1912 case on the other hand, 
Stout CJ had relied on the Native Land Act 1909. By focusing on an Act promulgated in 1909 as the 
statutory source of native title - an Act which post-dates his protest against the Privy Council in 1903 - Stout 
CJ was able to affirm the Privy Council ruling that there is a statutory basis for New Zealand native title, but 
to do so in a way that did not contradict his claims to the contrary in 1903. Paul McHugh has pointed to this 
face-saving manoeuvre by Stout CJ as follows: "Ignoring the possibility that earlier statutes affecting Maori 
traditional lands could have provided a basis for this 'statutorily recognized' title, Stout held it to have been 
created by the 1909 legislation. Here Stout had extricated himself, in so far as the choice of the 1909 
legislation cast no shadow upon his earlier decisions." (The Maori Magna Carta, above n 10, 121).  
However all the other Court of Appeal judges in the 1912 case perceived the statutory basis of New Zealand 
native title as preceding the 1909 Act (See Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, above n 108 , 347 
Williams J; 351 Edwards J; 352-53 Cooper J; 355-56, 357 Chapman J). 
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But what does the 1912 case tell us of the reasons behind the Court of Appeal's tenacious 
defence of the Wi Parata precedent a decade before? Most of all, I think, it tells us that this defence 
could not have been informed by a "nationalist" desire to uphold local against imperial precedents. 
If such a desire was behind this defence, then one must assume that this desire would be even more 
prevalent in 1912 than in 1902-03, because New Zealand would have had a further nine years to 
grow towards national maturity. And yet in 1912, the Court of Appeal moved in the opposite 
direction, to embrace the Privy Council precedents they had rejected a decade before. Consequently, 
it seems, the only consciousness which informed the Court of Appeal in its defence of Wi Parata 
was a "colonial" one – a desire to preserve what it thought was necessary for the stability and 
security of the New Zealand settlement process. Further, it appears that the anxiety and concern over 
this stability and security had sufficiently subsided by 1912 for the Court of Appeal to openly accept 
a Privy Council position which, only a decade before, they saw as a fundamental threat to this 
process. Consequently, far from the growth of a "nationalist" consciousness explaining this shift on 
native title by the Court of Appeal, between 1902 and 1912, it is best explained by a subsidence of 
"colonial" consciousness over this same period. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
This impact of the Privy Council decisions on the deliberations of the New Zealand judges in 
Hohepa Wi Neera, and later in Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, show the extent to which 
Nireaha Tamaki v Baker and Wallis v Solicitor-General altered the judicial landscape on native title 
in New Zealand established almost a quarter of a century before by Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington. The Hohepa Wi Neera judgment revealed the extent to which the Court of Appeal 
judges were willing to give reign to their colonial consciousness by evading the Privy Council ruling 
in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker in order to uphold a cherished New Zealand precedent on native title.  In 
contrast, the 1912 judgment of Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General showed the extent to which, 
one decade on, the Court of Appeal was capable of shedding that colonial consciousness and 
embracing those earlier Privy Council rulings, even at the expense of violating the legislative 
intentions of New Zealand Parliament, as enshrined in the Native Land Act 1909. Wi Parata was 
therefore a definitive judgment for the New Zealand Court of Appeal in two ways. At the turn of the 
century it defined that which it believed had to be defended against an imperial court, for the sake of 
maintaining stability and security of land settlement in New Zealand. And a decade later, it defined 
that which it had to leave behind if it were to shed that colonial consciousness, heal the breach with 
the Privy Council, and so move to a more impartial position concerning Maori and Pakeha 
differences over land settlement in New Zealand.  
116 (2004) 35 VUWLR 
  
 
